full-disclosure - Airmagnet management interfaces multiple vulnerabilities

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Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2006 18:00:11 +0400
From: noreply@...ecurity.ru
To: <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>, <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Airmagnet management interfaces multiple
	vulnerabilities

Airmagnet management interfaces multiple vulnerabilities

A management interface of AirMagnet Enterprise contains several middle-risk vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities ranges from reflected and stored Cross-Site scripting to remote code execution and protection bypass.

Smart Sensor Edge Sensor

Reflected (non persistent) XSS in 404 error page. 

Stored (persistent) XSS in log viewer via user name in failed logon record. 

Enterprise Server Web-interface stored XSS

AirMagnet Enterprise Server provides feature which can be used to check server status via https (Enterprise Server Status Overview). One of the pages (ACL) displays monitored APs status. SSID of AP echoed to the user browser without screening which can lead to XSS conditions.

AirMagnet Enterprise console and Remote Sensor console (Laptop) XAS

AirMagnet AirWISE feature provide detailed description of detected attacks. . AirMagnet console uses for displaying information about an intrusion embedded Internet Explorer object and inserts in the HTML template SSID of access points (or the client) without screening.

AirMagnet Enterprise console SSL mitm attack

AirMagnet Enterprise console don't validate Enterprise Server certificate, which can be used by attacker who can realize mitm condition between Server and Console to decrypt traffic and sniff administrator and sensors passwords. 

DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

May - September 2006 - Attempts to contact vendor without intelligible response.

18 October 2006 - Public disclosure

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