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Message-id: <200701101703.jtapi@psirt.cisco.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2007 17:00:00 +0100
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@...co.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Cc: psirt@...co.com
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Unified Contact
Center and IP Contact Center JTapi Gateway Vulnerability
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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Unified Contact Center and IP Contact
Center JTapi Gateway Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20070110-jtapi
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070110-jtapi.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2007 January 10 1600 UTC (GMT)
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Version and Fixes
Workarounds
Obtaining Fixed Software
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of this Notice:FINAL
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise, Cisco Unified Contact Center
Hosted, Cisco IP Contact Center Enterprise, and Cisco IP Contact
Center Hosted editions are affected by a vulnerability that may
result in the restart of JTapi Gateway process. Until this process
restarts, no new connections can be processed. Existing connections
will continue to work.
Cisco Unified Contact Center Express and Cisco IP Contact Center
Express are not affected by this vulnerability.
Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070110-jtapi.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
All versions of Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise, Cisco
Unified Contact Center Hosted, Cisco IP Contact Center Enterprise,
and Cisco IP Contact Center Hosted editions are affected.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
* Cisco Unified Contact Center Express and Cisco IP Contact Center
Express editions are not affected.
* Cisco Unified Intelligent Contact Management Enterprise and
Hosted are not affected.
No other Cisco products are known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
Details
=======
Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise (formerly Cisco IP Contact
Center [IPCC] Enterprise), an integral component of the Cisco Unified
Communications system, provides intelligent routing and call
treatment with blending of multiple communication channels.
Cisco Unified Contact Center Hosted (formerly known as Cisco IP
Contact Center [IPCC] Hosted) is a platform that enables customers to
move to a Customer Interaction Network. The Customer Interaction
Network is a distributed, IP-based customer service infrastructure
comprising a suite of multichannel services and customer relationship
management applications.
A vulnerability exists in all versions of Cisco Unified Contact
Center Enterprise, Cisco Unified Contact Center Hosted, Cisco IP
Contact Center Enterprise, and Cisco IP Contact Center Hosted
editions that may result in the restart of JTapi Gateway process. The
restart of this process can take up to several minutes and during
this time no new calls can be processed. Existing calls continue to
work. If the system is deployed in a redundant way, the redundant
system will take over preventing a loss of service. However the JTapi
Gateway on the redundant system can also be restarted by exploiting
the same vulnerability.
To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker will need to complete a
3-way TCP handshake to the JTapi server port. This port number can be
dependent on how the product is deployed and whether there is a
redundant pair of servers. It can be found in the Windows registry by
looking up the jtapiServerPortNumber value in the Windows Registry,
located at:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Cisco Systems, Inc.\ICM\
[instanceName]\PG[Number][A/B]\PG\CurrentVersion\JGWS\jgw[number]
\JGWData\Config.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------
Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Cisco will
provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute
environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco PSIRT will set the bias
in all cases to normal. Customers are encouraged to apply the bias
parameter when determining the environmental impact of a particular
vulnerability.
CVSS is a standards based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html.
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at
https://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss.
Cisco Bug IDs:
CSCsh15483 (registered customers only) - Third party connects to
JGW's TCP port, JGW asserts and fails over.
CVSS Base Score: 3.3
- - Access Vector: Remote
- - Access Complexity: Low
- - Authentication: Not Required
- - Confidentiality Impact: None
- - Integrity Impact: None
- - Availability Impact: Complete
- - Impact Bias: Normal
CVSS Temporal Score: 2.7
- - Exploitability: Functional
- - Remediation Level: Official Fix
- - Report Confidence: Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in the
restart of JTapi Gateway process. Restarting this process can take
several minutes and during this time no new calls can be processed.
Existing calls continue to work without any problems.
Software Version and Fixes
==========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
+---------------------------------------+
| Software | Patch | Maintenance |
| Release | | |
|----------+------------+---------------|
| 5.0 | ICM5.0(0) | |
| | _SR13_ES18 | |
|----------+------------+---------------|
| | ICM6.0(0) | 6.0SR10 |
| 6.0 | _SR8_ES3 | (Available |
| | | April 2007) |
|----------+------------+---------------|
| 7.0 | ICM7.0(0) | |
| | _SR4_ES43 | |
|----------+------------+---------------|
| | ICM7.1(3) | 7.1(4) |
| 7.1 | _ES5 | (Available |
| | | March 2007) |
+---------------------------------------+
Maintenance releases can be downloaded at:
http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/MDFTree.x?butype=cc
ICM5.0(0)_SR13_ES18 can be downloaded at:
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/d4b330d7b9c07d33f2833e1be69c6145
6.0.00_SR08_ES3 can be downloaded at:
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/48b796a9ba353f2d02897ae3e6bb1140
7.0.00_SR04_ES43 can be downloaded at:
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/47564eac9ea7b12357226a5f20bbbd66
7.1.03_ES5 can be downloaded at:
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/9df0152592e9779b3f9e8701a94e4422
Workarounds
===========
No workarounds exist for this vulnerability. The following general
mitigation actions are relevant for this vulnerability: Ensuring the
Cisco Unified Contact Center or Cisco IP Contact Center is physically
or logically separated from the data network and isolated from the
Internet which will limit the exposure to the exploitation of the
vulnerability from the Internet or internal data networks.
Apply access control lists (ACLs) on routers, switches, and firewalls
installed in front of the vulnerable network device such that TCP/IP
traffic destined for the Cisco Unified Contact Center or Cisco IP
Contact Center is allowed only from trusted sources. Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/tacl.html for examples on how to
apply ACLs on Cisco routers.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed
software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers
should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for
feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their
environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise
set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact either "psirt@...co.com" or "security-alert@...co.com"
for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows:
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@...co.com
Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the
TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by a customer.
Status of this Notice:FINAL
===========================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070110-jtapi.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@...co.com
* first-teams@...st.org
* bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@...nwatch.org
* cisco@...t.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
* full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@...sgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2007-Jan-10 | public |
| | | release |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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