full-disclosure - Re: [inbox] Re: Drive-by Pharming

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Message-ID: <NMEAJDJMDLJLOIOCIKJJGEJEHNAA.exibar@thelair.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2007 20:25:30 -0500
From: "Exibar" <exibar@...lair.com>
To: "pagvac" <unknown.pentester@...il.com>,
	"Fabian \(Lists\)" <lists@...enlayers.org>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [inbox] Re:  Drive-by Pharming

I feel this whole thing simply serves as a reminder to simply change your
default passwords on your devices.  REgardless of the type of device, CHANGE
THE DEFAULT PASSWORD!

 Exibar

> -----Original Message-----
> From: pagvac [mailto:unknown.pentester@...il.com]
> Sent: Saturday, February 17, 2007 6:32 PM
> To: Fabian (Lists)
> Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
> Subject: [inbox] Re: [Full-disclosure] Drive-by Pharming
>
>
> I'm sorry, this looks to me like plain CSRF against web interfaces of
> intranet network devices. If someone knows your router's password
> (i.e.: default password) and the router's HTTP requests are NOT
> tokenized (vulnerable to CSRF), then an attacker can most certainly do
> anything on your behalf by tricking you to visit an evil webpage.
>
> Changing DNS settings is just one of the many evil things you could
> do. Others include changing password to a new one (DoS to legitimate
> router admin user), exposing the admin web interface to the Internet,
> disabling security, exposing internal hosts to the Internet through
> port-forwarding, etc...
>
> Of course, if the web interface is designed really badly you might not
> even need a password to CSRF it. Some of you might recall the CSRF
> issue on Linksys WRT54g reported by Ginsu Rabbit back in August 2006
> which allowed you to turn off the security of the device completely.
>
> Ginsu Rabbit's Advisory:
>
> http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/442452/30/0/threaded
>
> PoC for the vuln:
>
> http://ikwt.com/projects/linksys/linksys-unauth-csrf.html
>
> CSRFing intranet devices research published in the past:
>
> http://www.whitehatsec.com/home/resources/presentations/files/java
script_malware.pdf

Am I missing something guys?

On 2/16/07, Fabian (Lists) <lists@...enlayers.org> wrote:
> Larry Seltzer wrote:
> > This "response" doesn't seem to address any Linksys (and therefore
> > Cisco) routers, does it?
>
> Seems so... Maybe because they are not IOS based and therefore not real
> "Cisco Routers" as we all know them?
>
> --Fabian
>
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--
pagvac
[http://ikwt.com/]

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/