Message-ID: <OFDF5C5B52.F68A6025-ON88257288.0073DFAD-88257288.0078F4BE@3com.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2007 14:01:09 -0800
From: TSRT@...m.com
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Cc: TSRT@...m.com
Subject: TSRT-07-02: Trend Micro ServerProtect eng50.dll
 Stack Overflow Vulnerabilities

TSRT-07-02: Trend Micro ServerProtect eng50.dll Stack Overflow
            Vulnerabilities
http://www.tippingpoint.com/security/advisories/TSRT-07-02.html
February 20, 2007

-- CVE ID:
CVE-2007-1070

-- Affected Vendor:
Trend Micro

-- Affected Products:
ServerProtect for Windows 5.58
ServerProtect for EMC 5.58
ServerProtect for Network Appliance Filer 5.61
ServerProtect for Network Appliance Filer 5.62

-- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability since January 16, 2007 by Digital Vaccine protection
filter ID 5101. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS:

    http://www.tippingpoint.com 

-- Vulnerability Details:
These vulnerabilities allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of Trend Micro ServerProtect. Authentication
is not required to exploit these vulnerabilities.

The specific flaws exist within the StCommon.dll library and are
reachable remotely through a DCE/RPC endpoint on TCP port 5168 bound to
by the service SpntSvc.exe. The RPC endpoint is exposed from
TmRpcSrv.dll with the following IDL stub information:

    // opcode:  0x00, address: 0x65741030
    // uuid:    25288888-bd5b-11d1-9d53-0080c83a5c2c
    // version: 1.0
 
    error_status_t   rpc_opnum_0 (
     [in] handle_t  arg_1,
     [in] long  trend_req_num,
     [in][size_is(arg_4)] byte overflow_str[],
     [in] long  arg_4,
     [out][size_is(arg_6)] byte arg_5[],
     [in] long  arg_6
    );

The upper half of the 'trend_req_num' DWORD RPC argument from above is
used within TmRpcSrv.dll as an index into a call table. It must
specifically be 0x0003 which results in a call to StRpcSrv.65671000().
The original arguments to the RPC endpoint are then passed to this
called routine:

    657416E6     mov eax, opnum0_call_table[eax*4]
    657416ED     test eax, eax
    657416EF     jnz short loc_65741707
    ...
    65741707 loc_65741707:
    65741707     mov [ebp+var_4], 0
    6574170E     mov edx, [ebp+sizeof_arg5]
    65741711     push edx
    65741712     mov edx, [ebp+arg5_array]
    65741715     push edx
    65741716     mov edx, [ebp+sizeof_overflow_str]
    65741719     push edx
    6574171A     mov edx, [ebp+overflow_str]
    6574171D     push edx
    6574171E     push ecx       ; trend_req_num
    6574171F     call eax       ; call handler

The lower half of the 'trend_req_num' DWORD RPC argument is then used
within StRpcSrv.dll as an index into a second call table. The value of
this lower half controls the code flow to the following vulnerabilities
and is hereto referred to as the 'subcode'.

--[ Vulnerability One
A subcode value of 0x0004 results in a call to
ENG_SetRealTimeScanConfigInfo() which subsequently calls through
Eng50.61181940() -> Eng50.611819E0() -> Eng50.61190F60() and can result
in a stack overflow due to an unbounded widechar string copy into a ~600
byte stack-based buffer as shown in the following relevant excerpt:

    61190FC7 lea edx, [esp+288h+szShortPath]
    61190FCB push esi
    61190FCC push edx
    61190FCD call _wcscpy

--[ Vulnerability Two
A subcode value of 0x0047 results in a call to ENG_SendEMail() which
can result in a stack overflow due to an unbounded widechar string copy
into a ~2k stack-based buffer as shown in the following relevant
excerpt:

    6118A161 mov esi, [esp+780h+arg_0]
    6118A168 lea eax, [esp+780h+var_778]
    6118A16C push esi
    6118A16D push eax
    6118A16E call _wcscpy

The resulting stack overflows can be leveraged to execute arbitrary
code under the privileges of the SYSTEM user. 

-- Vendor Response:
Trend Micro has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More
details can be found at:

http://esupport.trendmicro.com/support/viewxml.do?ContentID=EN-1034290

-- Disclosure Timeline:
2007.02.01 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2007.01.16 - Digital Vaccine released to TippingPoint customers
2007.02.20 - Coordinated public release of advisory

-- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by Pedram Amini, 
TippingPoint Security Research Team.

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