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Message-id: <200702281701.nam@psirt.cisco.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2007 17:00:00 +0100
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@...co.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Cc: psirt@...co.com
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Catalyst 6000,
6500 Series and Cisco 7600 Series NAM (Network Analysis Module)
Vulnerability
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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Catalyst 6000, 6500 Series and Cisco
7600 Series NAM (Network Analysis Module) Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20070228-nam
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2007 February 28
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Cisco Catalyst 6000, 6500 series and Cisco 7600 series that have a
Network Analysis Module installed are vulnerable to an attack, which
could allow an attacker to gain complete control of the system. Only
Cisco Catalyst systems that have a NAM on them are affected. This
vulnerability affects systems that run Internetwork Operating System
(IOS) or Catalyst Operating System (CatOS).
Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers.
This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070228-nam.shtml
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
Catalyst 6000, 6500 series and Cisco 7600 series that have a NAM
installed in them are affected. A system that has a NAM can be
identified by the show module command. A NAM will be seen as
WS-SVC-NAM-1, WS-SVC-NAM-2 or WS-X6380-NAM in this output.
This vulnerability affects systems that run IOS or CatOS.
A sample output for a system that has a NAM-2 on it is provided
below:
Cat6k#show module
Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No.
- --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ -----------
1 2 Catalyst 6000 supervisor 2 (Active) WS-X6K-SUP2-2GE SAL06417E23
3 48 48 port 10/100 mb RJ-45 ethernet WS-X6248-RJ-45 SAD050108R4
5 8 8 port 1000mb ethernet WS-X6408-GBIC SAD041300CL
6 8 Network Analysis Module WS-SVC-NAM-2 SAD093002AM
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
* Catalyst 6000, 6500 and Cisco 7600 series that do not have a NAM
are not affected.
* Network Analysis Modules for Cisco Branch Routers (NM-NAM) are
not affected.
No other Cisco products are known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
Details
=======
NAMs are deployed in Catalyst 6000, 6500 series and Cisco 7600 series
to monitor and analyze network traffic by using Remote Monitoring
(RMON), RMON2, and other MIBs. More information about NAMs can be
found at the following URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/switches/ps708/products_module_configuration_guide_chapter09186a0080394e09.html
NAMs communicate with the Catalyst system by using the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP). By spoofing the SNMP communication
between the Catalyst system and the NAM an attacker may obtain
complete control of the Catalyst system.
Devices running both Cisco IOS and Cisco CatOS are affected by this
vulnerability. This vulnerability is introduced in CatOS at 7.6(15)
and 8.5(1). Older CatOS images are not vulnerable.
This issue is documented in bug IDs CSCsd75273 ( registered customers
only) , CSCse52951 ( registered customers only) for IOS and
CSCse39848 ( registered customers only) for CatOS.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------
Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Cisco will
provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute
environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco PSIRT will set the bias in all cases to normal. Customers are
encouraged to apply the bias parameter when determining the
environmental impact of a particular vulnerability.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html.
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
CSCsd75273 - Cat6k NAM vulnerability
CVSS Base Score: 10
- - Access Vector: Remote
- - Access Complexity: Low
- - Authentication: Not Required
- - Confidentiality Impact: Complete
- - Integrity Impact: Complete
- - Availability Impact: Complete
- - Impact Bias: Normal
CVSS Temporal Score: 8.3
- - Exploitability: Functional
- - Remediation Level: Official Fix
- - Report Confidence: Confirmed
CSCse52951 - Catk NAM vulnerability, additional protection
CVSS Base Score: 10
- - Access Vector: Remote
- - Access Complexity: Low
- - Authentication: Not Required
- - Confidentiality Impact: Complete
- - Integrity Impact: Complete
- - Availability Impact: Complete
- - Impact Bias: Normal
CVSS Temporal Score: 8.3
- - Exploitability: Functional
- - Remediation Level: Official Fix
- - Report Confidence: Confirmed
CSCse39848 - Cat6k NAM vulnerability in CatOS
CVSS Base Score: 10
- - Access Vector: Remote
- - Access Complexity: Low
- - Authentication: Not Required
- - Confidentiality Impact: Complete
- - Integrity Impact: Complete
- - Availability Impact: Complete
- - Impact Bias: Normal
CVSS Temporal Score: 8.3
- - Exploitability: Functional
- - Remediation Level: Official Fix
- - Report Confidence: Confirmed
Impact
======
By successfully exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker may gain
complete control of the device.
Software Version and Fixes
==========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) describes a release
train and the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a
given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible
releases that contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the
anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the "Rebuild"
and "Maintenance" columns. A device running a release in the given
train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less
than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. The release
should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later
version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed Release label).
For more information on the terms "Rebuild" and "Maintenance,"
consult the following URL:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Major Release | Availability of Repaired Releases |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| Affected 12.1-Based Release | Rebuild | Maintenance |
|------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------|
| | 12.1(26)E8 | |
|12.1E |---------------------+------------------------|
| | 12.1(27b)E1 | |
|------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------|
| 12.1EX | 12.1(12c)EX | 12.1(13)EX |
|------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------|
| Affected 12.2-Based Release | Rebuild | Maintenance |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2EU | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(25)EWA7 or later |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2EW | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(25)EWA7 or later |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2EWA | | 12.2(25)EWA7 |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2IXA | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)IXB2 or later |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2IXB | 12.2(18)IXB2 | |
|------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------|
| | 12.2(14)S3 | |
|12.2S |---------------------+------------------------|
| | 12.2(18)S5 | 12.2(20)S |
|------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------|
| 12.2SG | 12.2(25)SG1 | |
|------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------|
| 12.2SGA | 12.2(31)SGA1 | |
|------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------|
| 12.2SRA | 12.2(33)SRA2 | |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2SX | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or |
| | later |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2SXA | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or |
| | later |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2SXB | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or |
| | later |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2SXD | 12.2(18)SXD7a | |
|------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------|
| 12.2SXE | 12.2(18)SXE6a | |
|------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------|
| 12.2SXF | 12.2(18)SXF5 | |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2SY | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or |
| | later |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2ZA | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or |
| | later |
|------------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| 12.2ZU | 12.2(18)ZU1 | |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------------------------------------+
| | Availability of Fixed |
| CatOS | Releases |
| Release |-------------------------|
| | Interim | Maintenance |
|-------------+-------------------------|
| 5.x | Not vulnerable |
|-------------+-------------------------|
| 6.x | Not vulnerable |
|-------------+-------------------------|
| 7.6(1) | |
| through 7.6 | Not vulnerable |
| (14) | |
|-------------+-------------------------|
| 7.6(15) | | 7.6(20) |
| through |7.6(19.2)| Available |
| 7.6(19) | | 2007-Mar-09 |
|-------------+---------+---------------|
| 8.5(1) | | |
| through | 8.5(5.3)| 8.5(6) |
| 8.5(5) | | |
|-------------+-------------------------|
| 8.6(x) | Not vulnerable |
+---------------------------------------+
Workarounds
===========
No workarounds exist for this vulnerability.
This vulnerability requires an attacker to spoof SNMP packets from
the IP address of the NAM. Filtering SNMP traffic to an affected
device can be used as a mitigation. Filtering SNMP traffic needs to
be done on systems that are deployed in front of an affected device,
since it is ineffective to filter against such spoofed packets on the
device itself.
Anti-spoofing measures and infrastructure access-lists can also be
deployed at your network edge as a potential mitigation technique.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/iacl.html for examples
on how to apply ACLs on Cisco routers for infrastructure protection.
Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within
the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion
document for this advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-air-20070228-nam.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed
software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers
should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for
feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their
environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise
set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact either "psirt@...co.com" or "security-alert@...co.com"
for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@...co.com
Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the
TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was found internally.
Status of this Notice:FINAL
===========================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070228-nam.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@...co.com
* first-teams@...st.org
* bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@...nwatch.org
* cisco@...t.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
* full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@...sgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+----------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2007-February-28 | public |
| | | release. |
+----------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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