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Message-ID: <20070301120845.GA16@fugu1.local>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2007 13:08:45 +0100
From: Moritz Jodeit <moritz@...eit.org>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: MPlayer DMO buffer overflow
There's an exploitable buffer overflow in the current version of
MPlayer (v1.0rc1) which can be exploited with a maliciously crafted
video file. It's hidden in the function DMO_VideoDecoder() in the
file loader/dmo/DMO_VideoDecoder.c. The variable format->biSize gets
its value directly from the video file, and thus can have any value
up to LONG_MAX. In line 136 it is used without any further checks as
the length argument to the memcpy() call, which can overflow the
this->m_sVhdr->bmiHeader buffer with data directly from the video file.
117 unsigned int bihs;
118
119 bihs = (format->biSize < (int) sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER)) ?
120 sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER) : format->biSize;
121
122 this->iv.m_bh = malloc(bihs);
123 memcpy(this->iv.m_bh, format, bihs);
124
125 this->iv.m_State = STOP;
126 //this->iv.m_pFrame = 0;
127 this->iv.m_Mode = DIRECT;
128 this->iv.m_iDecpos = 0;
129 this->iv.m_iPlaypos = -1;
130 this->iv.m_fQuality = 0.0f;
131 this->iv.m_bCapable16b = true;
132
133 bihs += sizeof(VIDEOINFOHEADER) - sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
134 this->m_sVhdr = malloc(bihs);
135 memset(this->m_sVhdr, 0, bihs);
136 memcpy(&this->m_sVhdr->bmiHeader, this->iv.m_bh, this->iv.m_bh->biSize);
This got fixed [1] in trunk two weeks ago.
[1] http://svn.mplayerhq.hu/mplayer/trunk/loader/dmo/DMO_VideoDecoder.c?r1=22019&r2=22204
Best,
Moritz Jodeit
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