Message-ID: <5937.131.182.179.153.1178041789.squirrel@slashmail.org>
Date: Tue, 1 May 2007 12:49:49 -0500 (EST)
From: "Steven Adair" <steven@...urityzone.org>
To: bugtraq@...security.net
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Month of ActiveX Bug

I think a good share of the time when someone states that the DoS may
"possibly" lead to remote code execution are making such a statement for a
couple different reasons:

1) They found a DoS and truly have no idea whether or not it can cause
remote code execution due to not having the knowledge/skills necessary to
check for it and/or lack of time to make such a determination.

2) They have seen characteristics that would indicate that remote code
execution is possible but have not quite been able to nail down a working
exploit "should" one be possible.

I do not think the evidence quickly available to us would bring us to
conclude most DoS's end up resulting in remote code execution -- or even
have the ability to.  I would agree saying "often enough" would be better
than "most."

However, regardless of whether it results in remote code execution, I
don't think a DoS should necessarily be discounted as frivolous or
irrelevant.  It might not rank up there with critical or high
vulnerabilities, but it is a vulnerability nonetheless.

Steven
securityzone.org

> Ok 'most' is probably bad wording on my part how does 'often enough' sound
> :).
>
> "Buffer overflow in the png_decompress_chunk function in pngrutil.c in
> libpng before 1.2.12 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a
> denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code"
> http://www.securityspace.com/smysecure/catid.html?id=57643
>
> "Buffer overflow in efingerd 1.5 and earlier, and possibly up to 1.61,
> allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly
> execute arbitrary code via a finger request from an IP address with a
> long hostname that is obtained via a reverse DNS lookup."
> http://cve.mitre.org/board/archives/2003-03/msg00013.html
>
> "A BrightStor ARCserve Backup contains four
> vulnerabilities that can allow a remote attacker to cause a denial
> of service or possibly execute arbitrary code."
> http://packetstorm.linuxsecurity.com/0703-advisories/CAID-McAfee.txt
>
>
> Note the use of 'possibly'. If it was possible then 'possibly' wouldn't be
> used.
>
> I'm not going to debate the validity of the month of activex bugs because
> frankly I don't care, merely
> that a DOS can turn out to be more and that at times either the researcher
> hasn't spent enough time on it, can't get the POC working, or lacks the
> skill to fully understand the problem.
>
> There have been multiple instances on the securityfocus lists throughout
> the years where a DOS suddenly
> became promoted to a remotely exploitable bug (i.e another person found it
> was actually exploitable). I'm not going
> to find them and post them here, but a little googling can yield
> results.
>
> - Robert
> http://www.cgisecurity.com/
>
>> >>Consider that most often a bug filed as DOS can actually be
>> exploitable, but the person who discovered it can't get the POC working
>> or is even aware it is. While command execution is the ideal goal it
>> doesn't mean other types of issues are *completely* worthless.  =20
>>
>> Most often? How do you know that?
>>
>> Larry Seltzer
>> eWEEK.com Security Center Editor
>> http://security.eweek.com/
>> http://blogs.eweek.com/cheap_hack/
>> Contributing Editor, PC Magazine
>> larryseltzer@...fdavis.com=20
>>
>
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