Message-Id: <E1ICyqk-0004bH-00@mrvnet.kundenserver.de>
Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2007 16:25:25 +0200
From: security@...ns.com
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk,bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: n.runs-SA-2007.022 - Norman Antivirus DOC parsing
	Detection Bypass Advisory

n.runs AG                       
http://www.nruns.com/                              security(at)nruns.com
n.runs-SA-2007.022                                           23-Jul-2007
________________________________________________________________________

Vendor:                Norman, http://www.norman.com
Affected Products:     All Norman Antivirus Solutions
Vulnerability:         Detection Bypass (remote) 
Risk:                  HIGH

________________________________________________________________________

Vendor communication:

  2007/05/07        Initial notification to Norman together with our RFP 
  2007/05/08        Norman Responses asking for the PoC files
  2007/05/08        Request public PGP keys
  2007/05/08        PGP keys exchange
  2007/05/08        PoC files sent to Norman
  2007/05/08        Norman has PGP incompatible version problems
  2007/05/08        Norman requests n.runs to send the PoC files RAR'ed 
                    with password sent in in a separate mail
  2007/05/08        Send the PoC files RAR'ed with password.
  2007/05/08        Send the RAR'ed files password.
  2007/05/08        Norman validates the vulnerabilities and informs that 
                    the vulnerabilities will take long QA process because 
                    the update for this vulnerabilities will need system 
                    reboot.
  2007/05/09        n.runs thanks for the feedback and asks for an 
                    estimation of time to fix the vulnerabilities
  2007/05/23        Ping Norman for a replay
  2007/05/23        Norman replays that has forwarded the PoC files to 
                    their engine/unpacker programmers, but hasn't 
                    received any update as to how fast these can be fixed.
  2007/05/23        n.runs thanks Norman for the feedback and reminds to 
                    keep aligned with n.runs RFP (for the delay in the 
                    replay)
  2007/06/19        Ping to Norman for update on fix status and reminds 
                    that the communication have to be aligned with 
                    n.runs RFP
  2007/06/19        Norman replays that can't decrypt the last mail (the 
                    PING mail of the same date) and that has generated a 
                    new DH/DSS key to use.
  2007/06/19        Re-Send the Ping to Norman for status update 
                    encrypted with the new Norman's key
  2007/07/05        n.runs requests a replay to the ping In Clear Text 
                    including the before mentioned PING mails as the 
                    contents have no sensitive information.
  2007/07/05        Norman replays and acknowledges that has received the 
                    previous PING mail and adds the "Head of Engine 
                    Development Team" in the loop.
  2007/07/05        Norman's "Head of Engine Development Team" replays 
                    that The OLE2 issues should be resolved with the 
                    latest scanner engine (5.91.02) and that the 
                    decompression issues, the crash cases will be 
                    resolved soon, and he would expect an update to be 
                    available within the next month
  2007/07/05        n.runs thanks for the update information, also asks 
                    how the credits are going to be handled and reminds 
                    that the communication have to be aligned with 
                    n.runs RFP
  2007/07/10        Norman replays the following:

"Sergio,

We have discussed your mail.  It is not our company's policy 
to publish information about vulnerabilities or bugs in our 
software, unless they are extremely critical and/or can be 
worked around by the end-user.  There are usually a large 
number of vulnerabilities/bugs in any software, and in our 
opinion it would only serve to unsettle user confidence in the 
products if the industry continually feeds information about 
such weaknesses, and we don't see that it would give the user 
any benefit in return. 

Instead we feel that it should be the supplier's 
responsibility to correct any errors and weaknesses and have 
them released to the user fast and silently, without alerting 
also the malware industry.

Hence, there is no forum where we can credit you for your 
findings.

We sincerely appreciate that you notify us whenever you find a 
vulnerability in our software, as we appreciate such 
information from other sources.  These findings, in addition 
to bug reports, are continuously being reviewed with respect 
to seriousness and work involved in fixing the problems, and 
assigned priorities accordingly, but no estimated dates for 
fixing the issues are published.

This has always been - and presently is - our company's 
policy.  This policy may of course be revised by company 
management at any time, if deemed necessary or useful."

  2007/07/11        n.runs replays that when they request the PoC files 
                    they implicitly accepted n.runs RFP and that the last 
                    mail was violating n.runs RFP and request a soon 
                    replay, otherwise the advisories would have to be 
                    release uncoordinated.
  2007/07/23        Norman DID NOT replay
  2007/07/23        n.runs assumes that Norman finalized their 
                    communication with n.runs
  2007/07/23        Advisories release
________________________________________________________________________

Overview:
 
Norman ASA is a world leading company within the field of data security, 
internet protection and analysis tools. Through its SandBox technology 
Norman offers a unique and proactive protection unlike any other competitor. 

While focusing on its proactive antivirus technology, the company has formed 
alliances which enable Norman to offer a complete range of data security 
services. 

Norman was established in 1984 and is headquartered in Norway with 
continental Europe, UK and US as its main markets.

Description:

A remotely exploitable vulnerability has been found in the file parsing 
engine.

In detail, the following flaw was determined:

- Detection Bypass through Integer Cast Around in .DOC OLE2 file parsing

Impact:

This problem can lead to malicious code detection bypass if an attacker 
carefully crafts a file that exploits the aforementioned vulnerability. 
The vulnerability is present in Norman Antivirus software since at least 
version 5.90.

Solution:

The vulnerability was reported on May 07 and Norman claims that the 
vulnerability was fixed since version 5.91.02.
________________________________________________________________________

Credit: 
Bugs found by Sergio Alvarez of n.runs AG. 
________________________________________________________________________

References: 

This Advisory and Upcoming Advisories:
http://www.nruns.com/security_advisory.php
http://www.nruns.com/parsing-engines-advisories.php
________________________________________________________________________

Unaltered electronic reproduction of this advisory is permitted. For all 
other reproduction or publication, in printing or otherwise, contact 
security@...ns.com for permission. Use of the advisory constitutes 
acceptance for use in an "as is" condition. All warranties are excluded. 
In no event shall n.runs be liable for any damages whatsoever including 
direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or 
special damages, even if n.runs has been advised of the possibility of 
such damages. 

Copyright 2007 n.runs AG. All rights reserved. Terms of apply.



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