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Message-Id: <1189190705.5457.21.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Fri, 07 Sep 2007 20:45:05 +0200
From: Erik Tews <e_tews@....informatik.tu-darmstadt.de>
To: Arshad Noor <arshad.noor@...ongauth.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, dev-security@...ts.mozilla.org,
dev-tech-crypto@...ts.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Firefox 2.0.x: tracking unsuspecting
users using TLS client certificates
Am Freitag, den 07.09.2007, 10:04 -0400 schrieb Arshad Noor:
> Alex,
>
> Do you presume that the websites in the domains that you intend
> to track users will install the self-signed CA certificate that
> issued the client-certificate to the unsuspecting user? If not,
> how will the browser know which client certificate to send to
> the website during client-auth? And what happens to the users
In TLS, the Server can for example request that the Cert was issued by a
certain CA, to select from multiple installed certificates.
> who do not have have client-certs issued by this CA when they
> attempt to connect to the site?
From RFC4346: If no suitable certificate is available, the client SHOULD
send a certificate message containing no certificates. That is, the
certificate_list structure has a length of zero. If client
authentication is required by the server for the handshake to continue,
it may respond with a fatal handshake failure alert.
So the connection can still be continued.
Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (190 bytes)
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