full-disclosure - Re: 0-day PDF exploit

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Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2007 14:01:05 -0400
From: <full-disclosure@....hush.com>
To: <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>,<jukeane@....upenn.edu>
Subject: Re: 0-day PDF exploit

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They are just covering their asses in case someone figures out a
scenario where this bug is actually useful, and tries going on a
media whoring campaign talking about how evil Adobe is for not
originally rating the vulnerability higher.

You bunch of whiny, prissy homo fucks.

On Wed, 17 Oct 2007 11:26:15 -0400 Justin Klein Keane
<jukeane@....upenn.edu> wrote:
>Adobe has a work around (but doesn't seem to have a fix yet) for
>this
>vulnerability (which they categorize as "critical").  They also
>state
>(and testing seems to validate) that impact is limited to Windows
>XP
>machines with IE 7.
>
>http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa07-04.html
>
>
>Justin C. Klein Keane
>
>Sr. Programmer Analyst and Information Security Specialist
>University of Pennsylvania
>School of Arts and Sciences Computing
>3600 Market St.
>Philadelphia, PA 19104
>
>eric@...hner.us wrote:
>>> Why everybody said it is a zero day about PDF? it's just a
>fault in
>>> IE7, or just want to make a big media hit? real PDF zero day
>will
>>> exists in the PDF's file format, or some Adobe's expanded
>functions.
>>
>> Actually, it's about PDF *and* IE7.  Both are at fault, and if
>either
>> one of them was doing the right thing, the exploit would fail.
>>
>> The first fault is Adobe's.  Because it's their code that first
>
>> acquires the input from the attacker, it's their job IMHO to
>validate
>> it properly, but they don't.  Instead, they turn around and tell
>
>> Windows to open the bogus URI.
>>
>> The second fault is IE7's.  The protocol handler used to fail
>> gracefully by rejecting this kind of malformed URI, but now it
>> doesn't.  The new behavior is to turn around and call
>ShellExecute()
>> with data taken from the URI.
>>
>> I prefer to think of it this way: Adobe's code has been doing
>the
>> wrong thing for years, and they've gotten lucky.  But now, a new
>bug
>> in IE7 has come along which makes the old bug in Adobe's code
>> exploitable.
>>
>> - Eric
>>
>>
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