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Message-ID: <1532521599.20071026004310@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2007 00:43:10 +0400
From: 3APA3A <3APA3A@...URITY.NNOV.RU>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, Oliver <olivereatsolives@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: TCP Hijacking (aka Man-in-the-Middle)
Valdis, you should back to Cretaceous period, because Oliver talks
about man-in-the-middle attack, not about blind TCP spoofing.
Randomized ISN doesn't protect against MitM.
--Thursday, October 25, 2007, 9:40:53 PM, you wrote to olivereatsolives@...il.com:
VKve> On Thu, 25 Oct 2007 10:09:47 PDT, Oliver said:
>> I have been searching all over the place to find an answer to this question,
>> but Google has made me feel unlucky these last few days. I hope I could find
>> more expertise here. The burning question I have been pondering over is -
>> could TCP connections be hijacked both ways?
VKve> Quick summary:
VKve> Steve Bellovin pointed out the issue. 19<stone age>
VKve> Kevin Mitnick exploited it. 19<bronze age>
VKve> Steve wrote RFC1948, which basically said "Use randomized ISNs so the attacker
VKve> has to work harder at it". 1996.
VKve> A lot of vendors sort of implemented it. 1996-2000.
VKve> Michael Zalewski did a nice phase-space analysis and showed a lot of vendors
VKve> botched it. http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/oldtcp/tcpseq.html 2000
VKve> A lot of vendors fixed their shit, but a lot didn't.
VKve> http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/ 2001.
VKve> You're now caught up to 6 years ago.
--
~/ZARAZA http://securityvulns.com/
Впрочем, важнее всего - алгоритм! (Лем)
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