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Message-ID: <4ef5fec60712062353n67a20627p5611d86042f32a5d@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2007 23:53:11 -0800
From: coderman <coderman@...il.com>
To: v.vitkov@...ys.bg
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re:
b0b27a223b66678f24aec254366526d7910d0f38679f6478804c7480d2271ce9
[was: TCP Port randomization paper]
On Dec 6, 2007 11:15 PM, Vladimir Vitkov <v.vitkov@...ys.bg> wrote:
> ...
> Strangely enough this stuff exists for more than 3 years ... Think GRSEC
> and more specifically Network stack randomization.
... and high throughput hardware entropy sources.
(aka, /dev/urandom fun, seeding at boot, and /dev/random sucked dry)
[ok, true entropy is overkill for port/isn selection when a secure
prng (yarrow?) will suffice. but if you've got 100M/bps[0] on tap,
why not spray freely over ephemeral port numbers and initial
sequences...]
best regards,
0. http://www.via.com.tw/en/initiatives/padlock/hardware.jsp
VIA PadLock Security Engine
(i'll leave the fun of coding a high throughput entropy daemon for
/dev/random to the reader. unless you happen to have a copy of mtrngd
laying around...)
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