full-disclosure - Re: Compromise of Tor, anonymizing networks/utilities

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <4ef5fec60712081814s58c36b58t5b12752642325c1d@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2007 18:14:31 -0800
From: coderman <coderman@...il.com>
To: jf <jf@...glingpointers.net>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Compromise of Tor,
	anonymizing networks/utilities

On Dec 9, 2007 1:29 AM, jf <jf@...glingpointers.net> wrote:
> > ...  scanning of
> > the Tor network and rapid flagging of "bad exit"...
>
> lemme know if you need ointment with that band-aid.

Tor, like wireless, is susceptible to denial of service with little
effort.  the goal of exit scanning is not to protect clients from MITM
at malicious exits (that can and will always happen) but merely to
reduce the scope of denial of service introduced when a rogue exit is
performing active attacks.

(that is, if your implementation is vulnerable, you will be fucked.
the only question is when will you be fucked, yes proper fucked,
tommy.

however, a proper implementation and quick flagging at the DA's lowers
the frequency with which you would chose this rogue node as your exit
(which fails, causing a denial of service for all paths exiting there,
but does not lead to exploitation and is remedied once a new circuit
is built...)

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/