full-disclosure - CVE-2007-6244: Adobe Flash Player ActiveX Control Universal Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

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Message-ID: <986207e70712191641if0a1ca3v12da3817625abe55@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2007 16:41:51 -0800
From: "Collin Jackson" <fulldisclosure@...linjackson.com>
To: "Full Disclosure" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: CVE-2007-6244: Adobe Flash Player ActiveX Control
	Universal Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

CVE-2007-6244
Adobe Flash Player ActiveX Control Universal Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability
19 December 2007

== Summary ==

Affected Vendor: Adobe
Affected Products: Flash Player ActiveX Control for Internet Explorer
Affected Versions: Adobe Flash Player 9.0.48.0 and earlier, 8.0.35.0
and earlier, and 7.0.70.0 and earlier.
Vendor Response: http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb07-20.html
Discovered by: Adam Barth and Collin Jackson, Stanford University

== Disclosure Timeline ==

30 September 2007 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
19 December 2007 - Coordinated public release of advisory

== Vulnerability Details ==

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to run arbitrary JavaScript
code in the security context of other domains, resulting in
information disclosure and session hijacking. User interaction is
required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a
malicious page or open a malicious file.

The specific flaw exists in the Flash Player ActiveX Control's
handling of the navigateToURL API, which takes two arguments, a URL
and the name of the frame to be navigated. The SWF movie can pass in a
javascript: URI and the name of a frame on some other domain. The code
in the URI executes in the security context of the named frame, rather
than the security context of the SWF movie or the page that embeds it.

== Demonstration ==

Proof of concept code is available at
<http://crypto.stanford.edu/advisories/CVE-2007-6244/>.

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