[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <693521105.20080116021902@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2008 02:19:02 +0300
From: 3APA3A <3APA3A@...URITY.NNOV.RU>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [FDSA] Multiple Vulnerabilities in Your
Computer (all versions)
Well, I cant' say it's all fake... It's all junk.
FD> OpenSSL 0.9.7j
FD> openssl-0.9.7j/fips-1.0/aes/fips_aesavs.c 973: User supplied data
FD> copied into fixed length buffer on the stack with no length
FD> verification.
Buffer overflow in non-suid test application (not compiled by default).
Not security.
FD> SSH 3.2.9.1
FD> ssh-3.2.9.1/lib/zlib/contrib/minizip/minizip.c 187: User supplied
FD> data copied into fixed length buffer on the stack with no length
FD> verification.
Identical to CVE-2007-1657 and is probably fixed in the same time. Local
overflow in non-suid application (minizip). Do not affect SSH. Only this
one can be considered as low risk vulnerability.
FD> Apache 1.3.37
FD> src/regex/split.c 164: User supplied data copied into fixed length
FD> buffer on the stack with no length verification.
Local buffer overflow in non-suid test application, which is not
compiled by default. Not security.
FD> Samba 3.0.25b
FD> samba-3.0.25b/source/popt/poptparse.c 27: Integer overflow in size_t
FD> which is later used in heap allocation. Buffer then copied into this
FD> memory resulting in heap overflow.
This one is fake.
size_t nb = (argc + 1) * sizeof(*argv);
...
nb += strlen(argv[i]) + 1;
...
dst = malloc(nb);
Mathematical provement:
nb <= memory already allocated for argc and argv < size of address space
nb < size of address space
QED
--
~/ZARAZA http://securityvulns.com/
Всегда будем рады послушать ваше чириканье (Твен)
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists