Message-ID: <001001c85c55$b1b5b3f0$6600a8c0@ecspt800ce>
Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2008 11:47:27 -0600
From: "Jerry dePriest" <jerryde@...net>
To: "Nate McFeters" <nate.mcfeters@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Professional IT Security Providers -Exposed]
	PlanNetGroup ( F )

not aimed at anyone in general. sorry Nate. just following a thread...
j.d.
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Nate McFeters 
  To: Jerry dePriest 
  Cc: SecReview ; full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk 
  Sent: Monday, January 21, 2008 11:29 AM
  Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] [Professional IT Security Providers -Exposed] PlanNetGroup ( F )


  Was that aimed at me or secreview?  I do NOT have MLK off, which is a travesty in and of itself, but I also feel it is important to challenge secreview on this matter.


  On 1/21/08, Jerry dePriest <jerryde@...net> wrote: 
    nice to see some have mlk off and nothing better to do
    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "SecReview" < secreview@...hmail.com>
    To: <nate.mcfeters@...il.com>
    Cc: <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk >
    Sent: Monday, January 21, 2008 10:40 AM
    Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] [Professional IT Security Providers -Exposed]
    PlanNetGroup ( F )


    > Nate,
    >    Your email was constructive and much appreciated. We'll go over 
    > the review a second time and incorporate some of your suggestions.
    > Thank you for taking the time to provide so much good feedback.
    >
    >
    >
    > On Mon, 21 Jan 2008 02:07:50 -0500 Nate McFeters 
    > <nate.mcfeters@...il.com> wrote:
    >>SecReview,
    >>My 2 cents on your review, although I will try to be nicer then
    >>you were to
    >>the reviewee.  I'm completely skipping your section where you 
    >>talked to the
    >>non-technical person, that's not even fair... sorta like reviewing
    >>a
    >>consulting group based on their website alone... oh shit, I forgot
    >>you guys
    >>do that too.
    >>
    >>Your comments on Question 1:
    >>
    >>We're not impressed with Michael's answer. First off we have no
    >>idea what
    >>the hell this means: "Depending on time and availability, we will 
    >>work on
    >>finding any new vulnerability if we generate an anomaly of
    >>interest." And we
    >>totally disagree with "Currently, the focus is primarily on
    >>discovering new 
    >>Oracle vulnerabilities - as MS SQL 2K5 is more difficult to beat
    >>on,
    >>compared to Oracle." In fact, whatever is being described above
    >>doesn't
    >>sound anything like a vulnerability assessment, we're not sure 
    >>what kind of
    >>service it is.
    >>
    >>The first portion "Depending on time and availability..." I don't
    >>understand
    >>what your confusion is.  Basically the responder is saying that 
    >>he's willing
    >>to do what the client will pay him for.  Consulting is not a
    >>cookie-cutter
    >>gig, so sometimes clients want you to spend 5 minutes running
    >>scans, some 
    >>want you to fuzz a proprietary protocol for as long as it takes.
    >>I
    >>personally don't think either end of the extreme is of value to
    >>the client,
    >>but you can hardly fault the respondent for delivering what the 
    >>client asks
    >>for.
    >>
    >>The second, I don't agree the overall focus is on Oracle, but if
    >>you read
    >>the new (ZDnet, eWeek), or if you follow the conferences (HITB 
    >>Malaysia 2007
    >>great Oracle presnetation), then you will know that Oracle is
    >>catching a bit
    >>of the limelight.  Besides that, I don't think you are qualified
    >>to say what 
    >>exactly a vulnerability assessment is... if the client is paying
    >>you to
    >>assess their database servers, then that is a vulnerability
    >>assessment of
    >>their database servers and that is what the work is.  Different 
    >>clients have
    >>different needs, and their are different specialty consulting
    >>groups to help
    >>meet those... can hardly fault him if his specialty is databases.
    >>
    >>Your Comments on Question 2: 
    >>
    >>>>trying to be cute with your "Again, carefully!" bullshit?
    >>
    >>Come on guys... imagine you get called by a group of people asking
    >>to assess
    >>your company and you don't know who they are, wouldn't you try to 
    >>befriend
    >>them if possible?  A little professionalism would go a long way to
    >>improving
    >>your reviews.
    >>
    >>>>A penetration test is not "Anything Goes!" 
    >>
    >>Umm... sorry guys, there is plenty of cause for performing a
    >>Denial of
    >>Service test.  Keep in mind that availability is a large portion
    >>of what
    >>security is about.  I don't think he's talking about using a bot 
    >>net to try
    >>to take them down.
    >>
    >>>>it doesn't sound like Michael knows how to perform IDS evasion
    >>testing.
    >>Using a proxy is >>not going to help anyone evade detection, it 
    >>will just
    >>help them to hide their IP address.
    >>
    >>Hmm... well, you're partially right.  I suppose that if he had
    >>enough proxy
    >>servers and kept his scans very focused, he "might" be able to get 
    >>around an
    >>IDS.  In any case, not all clients want IDS evasion performed...
    >>for
    >>instance, they may want to test their incident response, or, they
    >>may allow
    >>the consulting group through the IPS/IDS in an effort to save on 
    >>time and
    >>costs.
    >>
    >>Your response to question 3:
    >>
    >>>>From the answer above, it looks like they like the same tools as
    >>most
    >>people. That said, >>we've seen no proof of talent from anyone at 
    >>PlanNetGroup yet. So we're near certain that >>their deliverables
    >>ARE the
    >>product of automation.
    >>
    >>If they are the same tools that everyone use, how can you knock 
    >>them for
    >>that?  It seems to me that a group starts with a score of 0 in
    >>your book,
    >>and then if they impress you they get points.  If you don't ask
    >>the right
    >>questions, I don't see how they could impress you.  I concede, it 
    >>is
    >>certainly possible that they have no skills, and that they use
    >>automation,
    >>but I don't think it is fair to say that at this point of the
    >>review.
    >>
    >>Your response to question 4:
    >>
    >>>>Woha, it takes too much time to create a fake deliverable? Well
    >>that's one
    >>way to get out >>of it, but we don't buy it. Either way, at this 
    >>point we
    >>don't feel that a sample report would >>help this review, we've
    >>seen nothing
    >>impressive yet.
    >>
    >>Ever tried to do so?  It does take awhile, and it is risky.  If 
    >>you miss
    >>sanitization and release results of one of your clients you could
    >>get sued.
    >> Perhaps given the context of the investigation he didn't want to
    >>give you
    >>an old report and it would take to long and too much of his
    >>billable time to
    >>actually get this to you.  That's not unreasonable.  You aren't
    >>paying him.
    >> Again with the comments of nothing impressive yet.  You are 
    >>asking generic
    >>questions, how could anything be impressive?  It's a phone call or
    >>email and
    >>you are asking questions that almost all consulting groups should
    >>have 
    >>relatively the same answers to... I see nothing impressive in that
    >>at all.
    >>
    >>Your response to question 5:
    >>
    >>>>It sounds like Michael has a difficult time sticking to the 
    >>scope of work.
    >>Any time anyone >>performs Distributed Metastasis it should be
    >>built into a
    >>scope of work first. If it is not, >>then do not perform the
    >>testing because 
    >>it is invasive and will get you into trouble. This is >>a big
    >>negative point
    >>in our eyes as its critical that providers are able to adhere to
    >>the scope
    >>>>of work for each specific engagement. 
    >>
    >>I actually agree with most of this, but then again, as long as he
    >>doesn't go
    >>over the clients budgetary and time constraints and is providing
    >>the
    >>customer with value, I have no problem with going outside of scope 
    >>as long
    >>as the client does not.  Also, I don't know that it is a big
    >>negative as you
    >>say.
    >>
    >>Your response to question 6:
    >>
    >>>>It sounds like Michael is a corporate security guy and has no 
    >>experience
    >>as a hacker.
    >>Bit of a blanket statement I'd say, but OK, let's assume you are
    >>correct
    >>>>Certifications hold little to no water when it comes to real IT 
    >>security.
    >>Agreed, but you are totally putting words into his mouth.  He
    >>basically says
    >>the same thing by calling the CISSP a definition test.  Why do
    >>that?  Most
    >>people in security have the certs... most realize they are worth
    >>nothing and
    >>don't really test tech knowledge, but instead test business
    >>knowledge.
    >>>>What does hold water is experience and from what we can tell, 
    >>Michael has
    >>no real hacker >>experience.
    >>Please define "no real hacker experience".  If you mean he isn't
    >>31337 like
    >>you guys, then OK.  BTW, most clients aren't just paying for "real 
    >>hacker
    >>experience" they're also paying for the business side, i.e. what
    >>is my risk,
    >>how can I mitigate, etc.  A good team has both people.
    >>
    >>On your response to question 7: 
    >>
    >>Do you resell third party technologies?
    >>
    >>>>We don't think that it is a good idea that Professional IT
    >>Security
    >>Providers sell third party >>technologies. Specifically because 
    >>they become
    >>biased towards a specific technology and >>push that technology as
    >>a method
    >>of remediation when better methods might already exist.
    >>Agreed.  But that said, what if your third-party tech. has nothing 
    >>to do
    >>with the main thrust of your consulting work?  The question is
    >>pretty vague.
    >>
    >>On your response to question 8 and 9:
    >>
    >>Ok, I'll buy that you have cookie cutter definitions from google 
    >>of those
    >>flaws and that his definitions don't fit.  I'll even buy that you
    >>make a
    >>good point when you say EIP overwrite is not the only method of
    >>exploitation 
    >>(especially these days), but I'm wondering what you expected.
    >>Should he
    >>have rattled on and on about how to exploit b0f in an XP SP 2
    >>environment?
    >> Talk to you at length about DEP?  Bit ridiculous expectations. 
    >>Hell, while
    >>your at it, why didn't you ask him about integer overflows?  Off-
    >>by
    >>one/few/many exploits?  Heap overflows?  Why not have him recite
    >>the Heap
    >>Fung Sheui method to you?  What about double free flaws, dangling 
    >>pointers,
    >>etc. etc. etc.  Let's be serious here, unless you are contracted
    >>by
    >>Microsoft or another major software vendor, you probably don't pay
    >>the bills
    >>by doing your own research, so... does this really matter?  Sure,
    >>it's
    >>great... I'd like to know that consultants I was paying top dollar
    >>to knew
    >>about this, but if he comes on site and spends 3 weeks trying to 
    >>find an
    >>integer overflow, I'm going to be pissed.
    >>
    >>Disclaimer:
    >>I'm not a client of PlanNetGroup.  Also, I don't think what you
    >>are trying
    >>to do is a terrible thing, there's lots of snake oil being sold in 
    >>the
    >>commoditized security market out there, but I disapprove of your
    >>professionalism and your methods.  Also, I believe the list is
    >>still waiting
    >>for you to credentialize yourself/yourselves.  That still hasn't 
    >>seem to be
    >>grasped here.  Look, if you're someone people respect, then maybe
    >>people
    >>will buy your reviews, but somehow I doubt that is the case.  I'm
    >>basing
    >>that view off of the content of your website and the fact that you
    >>still
    >>have not credentialized yourself as the list called for so long
    >>ago.  Do
    >>that, and I will re-review my review of your reviews. 
    >>
    >>Nate
    >>
    >>On Jan 20, 2008 7:17 PM, secreview <secreview@...hmail.com> wrote:
    >>
    >>> The PlanNetGroup is a Professional IT Security Services Provider 
    >>located
    >>> at http://www.plannetgroup.com. <http://www.plannetgroup.com/>
    >>One of our
    >>> readers requested that we perform a review of the PlanNetGroup, 
    >>so here it
    >>> is. It is important to state that there isn't all that much
    >>information
    >>> available on the web about the PlanNetGroup, so this review is
    >>based mostly 
    >>> on the interviews that we performed.
    >>>
    >>> The PlanNetGroup was founded by Jim Mazotas of Ohio USA
    >>according to this Affirmative
    >>> Action Verification Form< http://odnapps01.odn.state.oh.us/das-
    >>eod/EODBMSDev.nsf/d881c0c739c3c9b985257344004f1929/c3e323de1df5162b
    >>8525735d00607a6d?OpenDocument>.
    >>> We called Mr. Succotash and spoke with him for about an hour 
    >>about his
    >>> company, here's what he had to say.
    >>>
    >>> When we spoke with Jim Mazotas we asked him how he defined a
    >>Penetration
    >>> Test. His answer wasn't really an answer at all but rather was a 
    >>bunch of
    >>> technical words strung into sentences that made no sense. Here
    >>is what he
    >>> said for the most part. We can't give you an exact quote because
    >>he
    >>> requested that some of the information related to clients, etc
    >>be kept
    >>> confidential.
    >>>
    >>> "We get to target object, where we go with that is based upon 
    >>the client's
    >>> comfort level. We grab banner information, backend support
    >>information, and
    >>> other kinds of information. During a penetration test we most
    >>will not 
    >>> penetrate. Most mid level companies will not want penetration."
    >>– Sanitized
    >>> Quote from Jim
    >>>
    >>> Not only do we not understand what Jim said, but he'd be better 
    >>off saying
    >>> "I don't know" next time instead of looking like an idiot and
    >>making up an
    >>> answer. This goes for all of you people that get asked technical
    >>questions.
    >>> If you say "I don't know" at least you won't look like a fool.
    >>Anyway.
    >>>
    >>> When we asked Jim to define a Vulnerability Assessment, we 
    >>became even
    >>> more flustered. Again his answer was like a politician trying to
    >>evade a
    >>> question with a bunch of nonsensical noise. Again, we've
    >>sanitized this at 
    >>> Jim's request.
    >>>
    >>> " A Vulnerability Assessment is more a lab based environment
    >>type test.
    >>> Analyze servers and all nodes that are a true vital asset to the 
    >>company and
    >>> assess the vulnerability In a very planned out manner. This is
    >>done in a lab
    >>> based environment." – Sanitized Quote from Jim
    >>>
    >>> Again, next time say "I don't know" because now you look like an 
    >>idiot.
    >>> Nobody expects you to know everything, but when you make shit up
    >>and try to
    >>> fool people, its insulting. To be fair to Jim, he did say that
    >>he was not 
    >>> technical, but we didn't get technical here. As the founder of
    >>the business
    >>> he should at least know what his different service boundaries
    >>are and how
    >>> his services are defined. 
    >>>
    >>> When we asked Jim if his team performed Vulnerability Research
    >>and
    >>> Development, he said that they did not have the time because
    >>they were
    >>> "fully booked". His primary customer base includes state 
    >>government and a
    >>> few private sector businesses. Unfortunately, we can't disclose
    >>who his
    >>> exact customers are. He did say that he provides Network
    >>Management Services 
    >>> and Wireless Management services for many of his clients. Sounds
    >>more IT
    >>> related than Professional Security related.
    >>>
    >>> When we finished with our call to Jim we asked him if he'd be 
    >>kind enough
    >>> to give us contact information for someone more technical in his
    >>company. He
    >>> told us that he'd be happy to arrange a call with someone. At
    >>the end, we 
    >>> didn't end up calling anyone but instead shot a few emails back
    >>and fourth.
    >>> The rest of this review is based on those emails.
    >>>
    >>> We decided to ask the same questions to Jim's technical expert. 
    >>We know
    >>> who his expert is, but we assume that he wants to stay anonymous
    >>because he
    >>> signed his email with "Jason Bourne". So for the sake of this
    >>interview 
    >>> we'll call him Michael. Here's the email from Michael:
    >>>
    >>> -) How do you perform your vulnerability assessments?
    >>>
    >>> "* Carefully! :) Typically, we will work with the customer to 
    >>define the
    >>> scope of the assessment; limitations to OS, Network Equipment,
    >>Web
    >>> Server, etc. This could be a combination of components
    >>(depending on
    >>> scope), the real goal ultimately with this is to assess the 
    >>patching
    >>> effort of a customer. Depending on time and availability, we
    >>will work
    >>> on finding any new vulnerability if we generate an anomaly of
    >>interest.
    >>> Currently, the focus is primarily on discovering new Oracle
    >>> vulnerabilities - as MS SQL 2K5 is more difficult to beat on,
    >>compared
    >>> to Oracle. Within vulnerability assessments, we disregard any 
    >>attempts
    >>> to evade IDS, IPS, etc."
    >>>
    >>> We're not impressed with Michael's answer. First off we have no
    >>idea what
    >>> the hell this means: "Depending on time and availability, we 
    >>will work on
    >>> finding any new vulnerability if we generate an anomaly of
    >>interest." And we
    >>> totally disagree with "Currently, the focus is primarily on
    >>discovering new 
    >>> Oracle vulnerabilities - as MS SQL 2K5 is more difficult to beat
    >>on,
    >>> compared to Oracle." In fact, whatever is being described above
    >>doesn't
    >>> sound anything like a vulnerability assessment, we're not sure 
    >>what kind of
    >>> service it is.
    >>>
    >>> -) How do you perform your penetration testing?
    >>>
    >>> * Again, carefully! The definition that I use with customers is - 
    >>
    >>> Anything Goes! In addition to attempting to locate missing
    >>patches,
    >>> vulnerable IOS's, applications, etc - we will perform an
    >>assortment of
    >>> timed attacks, attempt to spoof trusted connections, or even 
    >>perform
    >>> social engineering - like dropping a few pre-trojan'd usb data
    >>sticks
    >>> outside of a customer service area, a data center, etc. The only
    >>thing
    >>> that we do not perform, typically, is denial of service style or
    >>type of
    >>> attacks. We have had only one customer that we felt was in the
    >>position
    >>> to handle such a test and it was performed against their 
    >>disaster
    >>> recovery infrastructure, not production."
    >>>
    >>> Michael, why are you trying to be cute with your "Again,
    >>carefully!"
    >>> bullshit? A penetration test is not "Anything Goes!", if that's 
    >>how you
    >>> define it then I don't want you anywhere near any of my
    >>networks. And why
    >>> the hell would you perform a Denial of Service attack against
    >>anyone? 
    >>> Everybody can be knocked off line if you fill up their pipe. You
    >>scare us
    >>> man!
    >>>
    >>>
    >>> -) How do you perform evasive IDS testing?
    >>> 
    >>> "* We use a series of proxy servers to attempt to perform basic
    >>hacking
    >>> techniques; port scans, blatant attacks, etc. We are typically
    >>going to
    >>> look for TCP resets as a means to evaluate if IDS is present and 
    >>> possibly to find if IDS performs blocking activity. Often times,
    >>if a
    >>> system in a trusted DMZ can be compromised and used as a proxy
    >>> (exploiting a relationship or rule within a firewall) or an SSH, 
    >>SSL,
    >>> encrypted tunnel can be established to a server behind the IDS
    >>sensor
    >>> than we can successfully pull off an attack without the
    >>customers
    >>> security staff even knowing." 
    >>>
    >>> It doesn't sound like Michael knows how to perform IDS evasion
    >>testing.
    >>> Using a proxy is not going to help anyone evade detection, it
    >>will just help 
    >>> them to hide their IP address. If the target network or
    >>application is being
    >>> protected by an IPS device, then the IP that they are attacking
    >>from will be
    >>> shunned just the same. So, we understand that the PlanNetGroup's 
    >>expert
    >>> hasn't a clue as to how to evade IDS. (Michael, did you get your
    >>answer from
    >>> Google?)
    >>>
    >>> -) What tools do you favor?
    >>> 
    >>> "* We really do not favor any tools. The focus of our effort
    >>(Assuming we
    >>> are performing a pen-test or assessment) is to analyze a
    >>situation and
    >>> choose the best tool for the end result or compromise. I will 
    >>use commercial
    >>> applications, such as AppScan, WebInspect, even ISS. There are
    >>however
    >>> plenty of freeware, low-cost tools that we use; nmap, nessus,
    >>metasploit - 
    >>> ultimately, I find that an internet browser and a telnet prompt
    >>will suffice
    >>> for much of the testing. It ultimately gets back to interpreting
    >>the results
    >>> and adjusting the testing accordingly. We make it a point to try 
    >>out new
    >>> freeware tools on every assignment. The more tools that we know
    >>of and can
    >>> test with opens our options if in the future a situation best
    >>suited for a 
    >>> tool presents itself."
    >>>
    >>> Every business that delivers security services has a set of
    >>tools that
    >>> they use. These tools change from business to business, but 
    >>common ones are
    >>> nessus, webinspect, CANVAS, Core Impact, Metaspoloit, etc. From
    >>the answer
    >>> above, it looks like they like the same tools as most people.
    >>That said, 
    >>> we've seen no proof of talent from anyone at PlanNetGroup yet.
    >>So we're near
    >>> certain that their deliverables ARE the product of automation.
    >>>
    >>> -) Can you provide us with sample deliverables? (sanitized) 
    >>>
    >>> "* No, too much time. Even to sanitize creates an opportunity
    >>for a
    >>> liability in the event that a customer name is exposed ...
    >>accidents do
    >>> happen! I will say that we do not take dumps from applications 
    >>and
    >>> regurgitations the information on paper. We limit our executive
    >>summary to 6
    >>> pages at most and attempt to keep the entire report limited to
    >>25 pages in 
    >>> total. Our goal with a deliverable is to get the precise
    >>information to the
    >>> key stake holders so that they can make a decision."
    >>>
    >>> Woha, it takes too much time to create a fake deliverable? Well 
    >>that's one
    >>> way to get out of it, but we don't buy it. Either way, at this
    >>point we
    >>> don't feel that a sample report would help this review, we've
    >>seen nothing 
    >>> impressive yet.
    >>>
    >>> -) Do you offer the option of performing Distributed Metastasis?
    >>>
    >>> "* No, not really. This is my decision as in a previous life I 
    >>got walked
    >>> out of Bell Atlantic Mobile (Verizon Wireless) using this
    >>technique when I
    >>> compromised their Unix infrastructure by compromising the rlogin
    >>function 
    >>> (on all Unix servers, across all data centers). There is no
    >>substitute for
    >>> experience, especially bad ones!"
    >>>
    >>> It sounds like Michael has a difficult time sticking to the 
    >>scope of work.
    >>> Any time anyone performs Distributed Metastasis it should be
    >>built into a
    >>> scope of work first. If it is not, then do not perform the
    >>testing because 
    >>> it is invasive and will get you into trouble. This is a big
    >>negative point
    >>> in our eyes as its critical that providers are able to adhere to
    >>the scope
    >>> of work for each specific engagement. 
    >>>
    >>> -) What is your background with relation to information
    >>security?
    >>>
    >>> "* Too long, too boring. Yeah got the CISSP (nice vocabulary
    >>test), but 
    >>> had to as I worked for DOD. Got a number of Certifications (I
    >>have a stack
    >>> almost an inch thick and only get into them about once a year to
    >>throw
    >>> another couple on top of the previous ones - too much alphabet 
    >>soup for me,
    >>> but bosses and customers like it. Spoke at a number of
    >>> European conferences, but found too many people did not
    >>understand a word
    >>> I was talking about, so I got tired of that and quit that scene. 
    >>My outlook
    >>> on security has changed, to the point that I will advise
    >>customers of their
    >>> risk, attempt to make it practical - but if they make a
    >>conscious choice not 
    >>> to listen - I do not fret over it.?"
    >>>
    >>> It sounds like Michael is a corporate security guy and has no
    >>experience
    >>> as a hacker. Certifications hold little to no water when it 
    >>comes to real IT
    >>> security. What does hold water is experience and from what we
    >>can tell,
    >>> Michael has no real hacker experience.
    >>>
    >>> -) Do you resell third party technologies? 
    >>>
    >>> "* No, but kind of wished that we would. I think that it would
    >>help with
    >>> sales."
    >>>
    >>> We don't think that it is a good idea that Professional IT 
    >>Security
    >>> Providers sell third party technologies. Specifically because
    >>they become
    >>> biased towards a specific technology and push that technology as
    >>a method of 
    >>> remediation when better methods might already exist.
    >>>
    >>> -) Can you tell me why the EIP is important?
    >>>
    >>> "* The EIP controls an applications execution. If an attacker 
    >>can modify
    >>> the EIP while it is being pushed on the stack then the attacker
    >>*could*
    >>> execute their own code and create a thread (aka. a buffer
    >>overflow condition 
    >>> exists). I had a good refresher this past year at Blackhat with
    >>a course run
    >>> by Saumil Shah - he had an interesting buffer overflow
    >>> for the Linked-In client." 
    >>>
    >>> The EIP is the Instruction Pointer for the x86 architecture. The
    >>purpose
    >>> of the EIP is to point to the next instruction in a particular
    >>code segment.
    >>> If the EIP can be overwritten then the flow of control of an
    >>application can
    >>> be changed. In most cases this can lead to the execution of
    >>arbitrary code
    >>> on the targeted system. Hackers use this to penetrate vulnerable 
    >>systems.
    >>>
    >>> -) Can you define a format string exploit?
    >>>
    >>> "* A format string exploit leverages what is considered a
    >>programming
    >>> bug. If input is not sanitized, an attacker can perform calls to 
    >>the
    >>> stack; read, write, etc without knowing details about the EIP."
    >>>
    >>> Unfortunately this answer isn't accurate or detailed enough as
    >>almost all 
    >>> software vulnerabilities are the result of user input that is
    >>not properly
    >>> sanitized or validated. A format string condition occurs when a
    >>user inserts
    >>> a format token into a C based application and that input is not 
    >>properly
    >>> sanitized. Hence why it is called a format string vulnerability.
    >>When that
    >>> input hits a function that performs formatting, such as printf()
    >>the input 
    >>> is interpreted in accordance with the format tokens. Sometimes
    >>this can be
    >>> used to write arbitrary data to arbitrary memory locations. The
    >>EIP isn't
    >>> the only valuable memory location. 
    >>>
    >>>
    >>>
    >>>
    >>> If you've managed to get this far, then you've survived reading
    >>Michael's
    >>> answers to our questions. We're not going to spend much more 
    >>time writing
    >>> this review because by now we've formed our opinion. We did take
    >>a quick
    >>> look at the PlanNetGroup's website and as with their people, we
    >>were not the 
    >>> least bit impressed.
    >>>
    >>> Our opinion of the PlanNetGroup is that they'd have a hard time
    >>hacking
    >>> their way out of a wet paper bag. Their security expert is not 
    >>an expert by
    >>> our standards, as he did not properly answer any of our
    >>questions or help to
    >>> define any of their services. We're pretty sure that the
    >>PlanNetGroup could 
    >>> run nessus and offer basic vulnerability assessment services.
    >>We're also
    >>> pretty sure that they could offer IT services at some level. But
    >>we'd hardly
    >>> call them subject matter experts and wouldn't recommend their 
    >>services to
    >>> anyone.
    >>>
    >>> If you are using the PlanNetGroup services and feel that we have
    >>not given
    >>> them a fair review then please comment on this post. We will 
    >>consider your
    >>> comments. We have to say that Jim and Michael were both very
    >>polite,
    >>> friendly, and respectful, but we can't let their kind nature
    >>impact our 
    >>> opinion of their service delivery capabilities. We think that
    >>they should
    >>> sit down and try to define their services properly. We also
    >>think that they
    >>> should hire an ethical hacker with real world experience if they 
    >>intend to
    >>> protect anyone.
    >>>
    >>> Score Card (Click to Enlarge)
    >>>
    >>>
    >>>
    >>< http://bp2.blogger.com/_VcwqM25xL9M/R5PxN8GqVTI/AAAAAAAAACU/D7T4RS
    >>QlSXs/s1600-h/96YV5X.jpeg>
    >>>
    >>> --
    >>> Posted By secreview to Professional IT Security Providers - 
    >>Exposed<http://secreview.blogspot.com/2008/01/plannetgroup-
    >>f.html>at 1/20/2008 04:21:00 PM
    >>> _______________________________________________ 
    >>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
    >>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
    >>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
    >>>
    > Regards,
    >      The Secreview Team
    >      http://secreview.blogspot.com
    >
    > -- 
    > Love Graphic Design? Find a school near you. Click Now.
    > http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/Ioyw6h4fQlBYaiWpFnhi7pQK25eSsGhZHGXMnUnkrTsYbFDu13WWSE/ 
    >      Professional IT Security Service Providers - Exposed
    >
    > _______________________________________________
    > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
    > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
    > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/




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