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Message-Id: <20080407215123.d9c70b6e.aluigi@autistici.org>
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2008 21:51:23 +0200
From: Luigi Auriemma <aluigi@...istici.org>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk,
packet@...ketstormsecurity.org, cert@...t.org, news@...uriteam.com
Subject: Multiple vulnerabilities in HP OpenView NNM 7.53
#######################################################################
Luigi Auriemma
Application: HP OpenView Network Node Manager
http://www.openview.hp.com/products/nnm/
Versions: <= 7.53
Platforms: Windows (tested), Solaris, Linux, HP-UX
Bugs: A] format string in ovalarmsrv
B] multiple buffer-overflows in ovalarmsrv
C] Denial of Service in ovalarmsrv
Exploitation: remote
Date: 07 Apr 2008
Author: Luigi Auriemma
e-mail: aluigi@...istici.org
web: aluigi.org
#######################################################################
1) Introduction
2) Bugs
3) The Code
4) Fix
#######################################################################
===============
1) Introduction
===============
>>From vendor's website:
OpenView NNM "automates the process of developing a hyper-accurate
topology of your physical network, virtual network services and the
complex relationships between them. It then uses that topology as the
basis for intelligent root cause analysis to enhance network
availability and performance."
#######################################################################
=======
2) Bugs
=======
------------------------------
A] format string in ovalarmsrv
------------------------------
The ovalarmsrv.exe process listening on port 2953 is affected by a
format string vulnerability caused by the calling of ov.fprintf_new
(which then calls vsprintf) using the final message without a format
argument:
"Connection Refused; Data in listener port corrupt: ATTACKER_STRING"
------------------------------------------
B] multiple buffer-overflows in ovalarmsrv
------------------------------------------
The same process listens also on port 2954 where are handled some types
of requests using specific sscanf formats:
REQUEST_SEV_CHANGE (47): "%d %d %d %[^\n]"
REQUEST_SAVE_STATE (61): "%d %[^\n]s"
REQUEST_LOCAL (66): "%d"
REQUEST_RESTORE_STATE (62): "%d %s"
REQUEST_SAVE_DIR (63):
As visible by the previous format arguments there are no checks on the
length of the client string handled by the requests 47, 61 and 62 which
can be used to exploit a stack based buffer-overflow vulnerability
using a string parameter longer than 512 bytes.
----------------------------------
C] Denial of Service in ovalarmsrv
----------------------------------
Another problem of the ovalarmsrv service is that it can be easily
freezed with CPU at 100% and without the possibility of handling
further requests on port 2953/2954 simply sending some invalid values.
#######################################################################
===========
3) The Code
===========
A]
echo %n%n%s%n%n%s | nc SERVER 2953 -v -v
B]
echo 62 AAAAAAAAAAAAA...512_'A's...AAAAAAAAAAAAA | nc SERVER 2954 -v -v
C]
echo 47 1 2 what_you_want | nc SERVER 2954 -v -v -w 1
#######################################################################
======
4) Fix
======
No fix
#######################################################################
---
Luigi Auriemma
http://aluigi.org
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