full-disclosure - Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit Discussion)

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Message-ID: <D72EF68265B1D23E7BC988E8@Macintosh.local>
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 20:46:57 -0500
From: Paul Schmehl <pschmehl_lists@...rr.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: DNS Cache Dan Kamikaze (Actual Exploit
 Discussion)

--On July 16, 2008 11:17:07 AM +1000 Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@....org> 
wrote:

>
>> The real problem isn't signing or resigning zones, or even
>> successfully=20 completing the original configuration (although those
>> are not trivial for=20 the average person trying to setup their own
>> dns).  It's the trust=20 anchors.  Until the root is signed, trust
>> anchors are a PITA.  And until=20 the root is signed, why should anyone
>> believe that DNSSEC will achieve=20 wide adoption?
>
> 	Well there are a number of ccTLD's that are already signed.
> 	RIPE sign their part of the reverse space.  ORG is in the
> 	process of getting signed.  It's happening.
>
> 	There are existing solutions to dealing with lack of support
> 	in the infrastructure zones (includes the root).  You let
> 	someone you trust collect the trust anchors for you then
> 	incorporate them on a regular basis.
>
> 	We effectively do this everyday with https but for some
> 	reason people are scared to do the same thing with dns
> 	despite private parts of the keys never being available to
> 	the entity doing the certification.  With https the certifying
> 	authority can spoof any site they certify.
>

Perhaps that's because a cert problem on a web server breaks a single 
webserver.  A cert problem with dns breaks an entire domain.

Paul Schmehl
If it isn't already obvious,
my opinions are my own and not
those of my employer.

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