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Message-ID: <4893E27D.4040707@idefense.com>
Date: Sat, 02 Aug 2008 00:28:45 -0400
From: iDefense Labs <labs-no-reply@...fense.com>
To: vulnwatch@...nwatch.org, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, 
	bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: iDefense Security Advisory 08.01.08: Ingres
 Database for Linux verifydb Insecure File Permissions Modification
 Vulnerability

iDefense Security Advisory 08.01.08
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Aug 01, 2008

I. BACKGROUND

Ingres Database is a database server used in several Computer
Associates' products. For example, CA Directory Service uses the Ingres
Database server. More information can be found on the vendor's website
at the following URL.

http://ingres.com/downloads/prod-cert-download.php

II. DESCRIPTION

Local exploitation of a file permissions modification vulnerability in
the "verifydb" utility, as included with Ingres Database 2006 Release 2
for Linux, allows attackers to modify the permissions of files owned by
the Ingres database user.

The vulnerability exists within the "verifydb" utility included with
Ingres. It is used to cleanup unneeded files created in the database
directory. This program has the set-uid bit set, and is owned by the
"ingres" user.

The "verifydb" program improperly changes the permissions on files. The
program first creates a file called "iivdb.log" in the current
directory, and then makes it world writable. By creating a symbolic
link to a file owned by the "ingres" user, an attacker can gain write
access to the target file.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to overwrite
arbitrary files owned by the "ingres" user. By itself, this
vulnerability does not have very serious consequences. However, when
combined with the library loading vulnerability, it allows an attacker
to execute arbitrary code with root privileges.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in Ingres
2006 Enterprise Edition Release 2 for Linux x86 (32-bit). Other
versions may also be affected.

V. WORKAROUND

iDefense is currently unaware of any workaround for this issue.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

"This problem has been identified and resolved by Ingres in the
following releases: Ingres 2006 release 2 (9.1.0), Ingres 2006 release
1 (9.0.4), and Ingres 2.6."

For more information, refer to Ingres' advisory at the following URL.

http://www.ingres.com/support/security-alert-080108.php

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2008-3356 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

07/20/2007  Initial vendor response
07/23/2007  Initial vendor notification
08/01/2008  Coordinated public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php

Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com/

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2008 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail customerservice@...fense.com for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
 There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.

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