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Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2008 17:31:15 +0100
From: "Dave Korn" <dave.korn@...imi.com>
To: "'Eric Rescorla'" <ekr@...workresonance.com>,
"'Ben Laurie'" <benl@...gle.com>
Cc: security@...nid.net, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk,
bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, 'OpenID List' <general@...nid.net>,
cryptography@...zdowd.com
Subject: Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning
advisory
Eric Rescorla wrote on 08 August 2008 16:06:
> At Fri, 8 Aug 2008 11:50:59 +0100,
> Ben Laurie wrote:
>> However, since the CRLs will almost certainly not be checked, this
>> means the site will still be vulnerable to attack for the lifetime of
>> the certificate (and perhaps beyond, depending on user
>> behaviour). Note that shutting down the site DOES NOT prevent the attack.
>>
>> Therefore mitigation falls to other parties.
>>
>> 1. Browsers must check CRLs by default.
>
> Isn't this a good argument for blacklisting the keys on the client
> side?
Isn't that exactly what "Browsers must check CRLs" means in this context
anyway? What alternative client-side blacklisting mechanism do you suggest?
cheers,
DaveK
--
Can't think of a witty .sigline today....
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