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Message-ID: <489CF4E8.5020008@mibsoftware.com>
Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2008 21:37:44 -0400
From: "Forrest J. Cavalier III" <mibsoft@...software.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@...workresonance.com>
Cc: Dan Kaminsky <dan@...para.com>, cryptography@...zdowd.com,
Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@....com>,
Dave Korn <dave.korn@...imi.com>,
full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com,
'OpenID List' <general@...nid.net>, security@...nid.net,
"Leichter, Jerry" <leichter_jerrold@....com>
Subject: Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning
advisory
Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> To be concrete, we have 2^15 distinct keys, so, the
> probability of a false positive becomes (2^15)/(2^b)=2^(b-15).
> To get that probability below 1 billion, b+15 >= 30, so
> you need about 45 bits. I chose 64 because it seemed to me
> that a false positive probability of 2^{-48} or so was better.
>
> -Ekr
Since it's a known set, I think you can use perfect hashing.
There will still be false positives, but presumably no
"bad" keys, nor keys matching the hash everyone agrees on,
are going to be issued after today, right?
Yeah, right.
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