full-disclosure - Port Randomization: New revision of our IETF Internet-Draft

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Message-ID: <48ba9a4c.1287460a.1e2a.4b7c@mx.google.com>
Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2008 10:14:52 -0300
From: Fernando Gont <fernando.gont@...il.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com,full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Port Randomization: New revision of our IETF
	Internet-Draft

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Folks,

We have published a revision of our IETF Internet-Draft about port
randomization.  It is available at:
http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/port-randomization/draft-ietf-tsvwg-port-rand
omization-02.txt (you can find the document in other fancy formats at:
http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/port-randomization/index.html)

This new revision of the document addresses the feedback we got from Amit
Klein, Matthias Bethke, and Alfred Hoenes.

The  abstract of the document is:
- ---- cut here ----
    Recently, awareness has been raised about a number of "blind" attacks
    that can be performed against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
    and similar protocols.  The consequences of these attacks range from
    throughput-reduction to broken connections or data corruption.  These
    attacks rely on the attacker's ability to guess or know the five-
    tuple (Protocol, Source Address, Destination Address, Source Port,
    Destination Port) that identifies the transport protocol instance to
    be attacked.  This document describes a number of simple and
    efficient methods for the random selection of the client port number,
    such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is
    reduced.  While this is not a replacement for cryptographic methods,
    the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved
    security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key
    management overhead.  The algorithms described in this document are
    local policies that may be incrementally deployed, and that do not
    violate the specifications of any of the transport protocols that may
    benefit from them, such as TCP, UDP, UDP-lite, SCTP, DCCP, and RTP.
- ---- cut here ----

Any comments will be more than welcome.

Thanks!

Kind regards,
- --
Fernando Gont
e-mail: fernando@...t.com.ar || fgont@....org
PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1





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--
Fernando Gont
e-mail: fernando@...t.com.ar || fgont@....org
PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1




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