full-disclosure - Re: [inbox] Re: Fwd: Comment on: USB devices spreading viruses

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Message-ID: <754924960811231205w16593b8br32c77edf2db6b771@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2008 01:50:32 +0545
From: "Bipin Gautam" <bipin.gautam@...il.com>
To: "Mike C" <mike.cartall@...il.com>
Cc: Full Disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>,
	imipak <imipak@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [inbox] Re: Fwd: Comment on: USB devices
	spreading viruses

On 11/23/08, Mike C <mike.cartall@...il.com> wrote:

>> Of course, blindly thwacking people / dragging them to HR by the hair
>> when they're really just trying to do their jobs is
>> counter-productive. The calls also show us where we, security, are
>> falling down. Perhaps it's poor awareness training (if the user didn't
>> know that they shouldn't run unapproved software, or why we have that
>> rule, or how to get a new app approved); or could be that the official
>> route is being seen as too slow or bureaucratic, in which case it
>> needs fixing. And so on.
>>
>
> All I hope is we can fix the issue. Hopefully in the near future.
>

Yeah!
Here is my prospective to a possible solution that wouldn't compromise
usability.

But, first lets all agree on "banning execution of any binary from
removable media" is the only straightforward solution this decades old
problem of virus infection/propagation from removable media.

See, if a web-page tries to install an activeX / browser plugin, your
browser (non intrusively) waits for user interaction with a security
warning message on "if you really intend to install the plugin (Which
may be harmful!)" or .......may choose to ignore the dialog and
continue browsing.

Here, it is assumed "user understands" the security impact of
executing untrusted programs from internet and let the execution
decision left to the end user with manual interaction. If the plugin
installation behavior is not intended user can simply ignore the
manual interaction request for execution and instead continue.

In similar way, anti virus company or Microsoft should create similar
for "My Computer Zone" where the first execution of a binary "from
removable media" is denied by default and prompt for user interaction
to execute, white list&execute or terminate/ban the request for
execution from removable media like the way internet explorer (non
intrusively) handles installation of activeX like in IE. Binary
execution from removable media should be treated that way ( untrusted
! )

Pen drive / SD have unique serial numbers which can be used to
identify and permanently whitelist or blacklist the media from
execution.

Windows already has a feature for prompting if user tries to execute
binary from intranet/shared folder or execution of binary marked as
downloaded from "Internet Zone"

Why not have similar for binary execution from removable media as well!?

What better could be the solution to stopping virus to propagate from
removable medias with (default) FAT file system. (lacking ACL's)

For corporate environment let there be feature to sync these white
listed/blacklisted hashes of executable or removable media UID from
anti virus server/domain controller to anti virus clients/related
service running in user end.

Will this work :)?

-thanks,
bipin

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