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Message-ID: <754924960811232117u6e4ca0f8tc8208b7a950fdf4e@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2008 11:02:34 +0545
From: "Bipin Gautam" <bipin.gautam@...il.com>
To: "James Matthews" <nytrokiss@...il.com>
Cc: Full Disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [inbox] Re: Fwd: Comment on: USB devices
	spreading viruses

On 11/24/08, James Matthews <nytrokiss@...il.com> wrote:
> bit9 and kaspersky offer this new service. Companies should make use of it.
>

what service, James!

Could you please explain more...

I find it ridicules to know that this problem has been there since the
earliest version of windows but still without a generic solution! Is
this unwillingness for the approach to a proper solution is what has
fueled the "antivirus business" for so long?

If you look in the *nix side you will see this technique is
tested/proven. Signature based or behavior based approach detection
will continue to fail.

To address this never-ending problem of virus infection from removable
media, i have implemented no-execution-from-removable to dorzons of
computers in the past years, even the dumbest of users understand what
is being done and feel safe about they wont likely have virus
infection from the removable media ever, even if the media has a
virus. They know workaround on how to temporarily disable the
restriction if they are willing to run something trustworthy as i have
made the users clear there is no solution to the problem of virus
infection from removable media and and you have to learn these few
things ...like you have learned to use antivirus software to stay
safe. Users get it, really!

Antivirus companies should take similar approach (as described
previously) to address it but adding USABILITY.

This problem is there to stay for years to come. What better could be
the proper solution to this problem?

thanks,
-bipin



> On Sun, Nov 23, 2008 at 10:05 PM, Bipin Gautam
> <bipin.gautam@...il.com>wrote:
>
>> On 11/23/08, Mike C <mike.cartall@...il.com> wrote:
>>
>> >> Of course, blindly thwacking people / dragging them to HR by the hair
>> >> when they're really just trying to do their jobs is
>> >> counter-productive. The calls also show us where we, security, are
>> >> falling down. Perhaps it's poor awareness training (if the user didn't
>> >> know that they shouldn't run unapproved software, or why we have that
>> >> rule, or how to get a new app approved); or could be that the official
>> >> route is being seen as too slow or bureaucratic, in which case it
>> >> needs fixing. And so on.
>> >>
>> >
>> > All I hope is we can fix the issue. Hopefully in the near future.
>> >
>>
>>
>> Yeah!
>> Here is my prospective to a possible solution that wouldn't compromise
>> usability.
>>
>> But, first lets all agree on "banning execution of any binary from
>> removable media" is the only straightforward solution this decades old
>> problem of virus infection/propagation from removable media.
>>
>> See, if a web-page tries to install an activeX / browser plugin, your
>> browser (non intrusively) waits for user interaction with a security
>> warning message on "if you really intend to install the plugin (Which
>> may be harmful!)" or .......may choose to ignore the dialog and
>> continue browsing.
>>
>> Here, it is assumed "user understands" the security impact of
>> executing untrusted programs from internet and let the execution
>> decision left to the end user with manual interaction. If the plugin
>> installation behavior is not intended user can simply ignore the
>> manual interaction request for execution and instead continue.
>>
>> In similar way, anti virus company or Microsoft should create similar
>> for "My Computer Zone" where the first execution of a binary "from
>> removable media" is denied by default and prompt for user interaction
>> to execute, white list&execute or terminate/ban the request for
>> execution from removable media like the way internet explorer (non
>> intrusively) handles installation of activeX like in IE. Binary
>> execution from removable media should be treated that way ( untrusted
>> ! )
>>
>> Pen drive / SD have unique serial numbers which can be used to
>> identify and permanently whitelist or blacklist the media from
>> execution.
>>
>> Windows already has a feature for prompting if user tries to execute
>> binary from intranet/shared folder or execution of binary marked as
>> downloaded from "Internet Zone"
>>
>> Why not have similar for binary execution from removable media as well!?
>>
>> What better could be the solution to stopping virus to propagate from
>> removable medias with (default) FAT file system. (lacking ACL's)
>>
>> For corporate environment let there be feature to sync these white
>> listed/blacklisted hashes of executable or removable media UID from
>> anti virus server/domain controller to anti virus clients/related
>> service running in user end.
>>
>> Will this work :)?
>>
>> -thanks,
>> bipin
>>
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>
>
>
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