Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2008 16:04:00 +0800
From: "Salvador III Manaois" <badzmanaois@...il.com>
To: "Elazar Broad" <elazar@...hmail.com>, nytrokiss@...il.com, 
	bipin.gautam@...il.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [inbox] Re: Fwd: Comment on: USB devices
	spreading viruses

This feature (blocking based on device ID) is also a built in feature
of Windows Server 2008 group policy. An administrator can now
centrally restrict devices from being installed on computers in his
organization. The implementation, though, is not for the
faint-hearted, it requires creating a list of authorized devices and
adding them to the "Allow installation of devices that match any of
these device IDs" under the following group policy tree:

Computer Configuration
 -> Administrative Templates,
   -> System
     -> Device Installation
       -> Device Installation Restrictions

Here are a couple of Technet links that provide more detail on this:

http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc731387.aspx
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/cc138012.aspx

...Badz...
Bytes & Badz: http://badzmanaois.blogspot.com

On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 3:08 PM, Elazar Broad <elazar@...hmail.com> wrote:
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> Symantec's Endpoint Protection has a device control feature which
> basically functions as you have stated. I haven't really played
> around with it much, however, it can block devices based on device
> id...
>
> elazar
>
> On Mon, 24 Nov 2008 00:17:34 -0500 Bipin Gautam
> <bipin.gautam@...il.com> wrote:
>>On 11/24/08, James Matthews <nytrokiss@...il.com> wrote:
>>> bit9 and kaspersky offer this new service. Companies should make
>>use of it.
>>>
>>
>>what service, James!
>>
>>Could you please explain more...
>>
>>I find it ridicules to know that this problem has been there since
>>the
>>earliest version of windows but still without a generic solution!
>>Is
>>this unwillingness for the approach to a proper solution is what
>>has
>>fueled the "antivirus business" for so long?
>>
>>If you look in the *nix side you will see this technique is
>>tested/proven. Signature based or behavior based approach
>>detection
>>will continue to fail.
>>
>>To address this never-ending problem of virus infection from
>>removable
>>media, i have implemented no-execution-from-removable to dorzons
>>of
>>computers in the past years, even the dumbest of users understand
>>what
>>is being done and feel safe about they wont likely have virus
>>infection from the removable media ever, even if the media has a
>>virus. They know workaround on how to temporarily disable the
>>restriction if they are willing to run something trustworthy as i
>>have
>>made the users clear there is no solution to the problem of virus
>>infection from removable media and and you have to learn these few
>>things ...like you have learned to use antivirus software to stay
>>safe. Users get it, really!
>>
>>Antivirus companies should take similar approach (as described
>>previously) to address it but adding USABILITY.
>>
>>This problem is there to stay for years to come. What better could
>>be
>>the proper solution to this problem?
>>
>>thanks,
>>-bipin
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Sun, Nov 23, 2008 at 10:05 PM, Bipin Gautam
>>> <bipin.gautam@...il.com>wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 11/23/08, Mike C <mike.cartall@...il.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> >> Of course, blindly thwacking people / dragging them to HR by
>>the hair
>>>> >> when they're really just trying to do their jobs is
>>>> >> counter-productive. The calls also show us where we,
>>security, are
>>>> >> falling down. Perhaps it's poor awareness training (if the
>>user didn't
>>>> >> know that they shouldn't run unapproved software, or why we
>>have that
>>>> >> rule, or how to get a new app approved); or could be that
>>the official
>>>> >> route is being seen as too slow or bureaucratic, in which
>>case it
>>>> >> needs fixing. And so on.
>>>> >>
>>>> >
>>>> > All I hope is we can fix the issue. Hopefully in the near
>>future.
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yeah!
>>>> Here is my prospective to a possible solution that wouldn't
>>compromise
>>>> usability.
>>>>
>>>> But, first lets all agree on "banning execution of any binary
>>from
>>>> removable media" is the only straightforward solution this
>>decades old
>>>> problem of virus infection/propagation from removable media.
>>>>
>>>> See, if a web-page tries to install an activeX / browser
>>plugin, your
>>>> browser (non intrusively) waits for user interaction with a
>>security
>>>> warning message on "if you really intend to install the plugin
>>(Which
>>>> may be harmful!)" or .......may choose to ignore the dialog and
>>>> continue browsing.
>>>>
>>>> Here, it is assumed "user understands" the security impact of
>>>> executing untrusted programs from internet and let the
>>execution
>>>> decision left to the end user with manual interaction. If the
>>plugin
>>>> installation behavior is not intended user can simply ignore
>>the
>>>> manual interaction request for execution and instead continue.
>>>>
>>>> In similar way, anti virus company or Microsoft should create
>>similar
>>>> for "My Computer Zone" where the first execution of a binary
>>"from
>>>> removable media" is denied by default and prompt for user
>>interaction
>>>> to execute, white list&execute or terminate/ban the request for
>>>> execution from removable media like the way internet explorer
>>(non
>>>> intrusively) handles installation of activeX like in IE. Binary
>>>> execution from removable media should be treated that way (
>>untrusted
>>>> ! )
>>>>
>>>> Pen drive / SD have unique serial numbers which can be used to
>>>> identify and permanently whitelist or blacklist the media from
>>>> execution.
>>>>
>>>> Windows already has a feature for prompting if user tries to
>>execute
>>>> binary from intranet/shared folder or execution of binary
>>marked as
>>>> downloaded from "Internet Zone"
>>>>
>>>> Why not have similar for binary execution from removable media
>>as well!?
>>>>
>>>> What better could be the solution to stopping virus to
>>propagate from
>>>> removable medias with (default) FAT file system. (lacking
>>ACL's)
>>>>
>>>> For corporate environment let there be feature to sync these
>>white
>>>> listed/blacklisted hashes of executable or removable media UID
>>from
>>>> anti virus server/domain controller to anti virus
>>clients/related
>>>> service running in user end.
>>>>
>>>> Will this work :)?
>>>>
>>>> -thanks,
>>>> bipin
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
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