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Message-ID: <2707a2950812310441i8ab76c7pb2eef3498172424@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2008 07:41:23 -0500
From: "fd throwaway" <fd.throwaway@...il.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Creating a rogue CA certificate
> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk
> [*mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk*<full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk>]
On Behalf
> Of jlay@...ve-tothe-box.net
> Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2008 3:17 PM
> To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Creating a rogue CA certificate
>
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > Hash: SHA1
> >
> > SSL/PKI is only as strong as the weakest CA...
> >
> > For those of you who haven't been following this, here you go:
> >
> > *http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/*<http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/>
> > *http://www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/md5-collisions-1.0.ppt*<http://www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/md5-collisions-1.0.ppt>
> >
> > Enjoy and Happy New Years!
> >
> > elazar
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > Charset: UTF8
> > Version: Hush 3.0
> > Note: This signature can be verified at
> > *https://www.hushtools.com/verify* <https://www.hushtools.com/verify>
> >
> > wpwEAQECAAYFAklaVFQACgkQi04xwClgpZh4TQP+ODe2/jTHhOrLbKtoSJhZInX+lJXt
> > LMkU/xlYK1Au/f1E5KhXt43uMWYSeC/M0njQRPLyrDfihFlLsmAxGK/97kRQfxEttbcN
> > R0q1BL+WmbiGNglujzSWHqMSkn20r12itVfGP77nEbGYbjidV1BXxFNR2QQwLHZhGLWe
> > gVO/5Zg=
> > =+Pm+
> > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >
> > --
> > Click for free info on getting an MBA, $200K/ year potential.
> >
> >
> *http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/PnY6qxsZwUN6299xt0fJO8HvJUKovV4hcZ7MH3I*<http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/PnY6qxsZwUN6299xt0fJO8HvJUKovV4hcZ7MH3I>
> > 6KbhlC0IDsYiG8/
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter: *http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html*<http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html>
> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - *http://secunia.com/*<http://secunia.com/>
> >
> >
>
> >From Microsoft:
> *http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961509.mspx*<http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961509.mspx>
>
> "Microsoft is not aware of specific attacks against MD5, so
> previously issued certificates that were signed using MD5 are
> not affected and do not need to be revoked. This issue only
> affects certificates being signed using MD5 after the
> publication of the attack method."
>
> I take it the above is incorrect?
>
> James
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: *http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html*<http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html>
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - *http://secunia.com/*<http://secunia.com/>
>
No it is correct because the attack creates a new CA from the compromised
cert which is then used to sign certs, it doesn't involve copying the
signatures of certs that already have been signed by legit CAs with the
exception of the one that is used to create the rogue CA
Content of type "text/html" skipped
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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