full-disclosure - Re: FD / lists.grok.org

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Message-ID: <20090105204720.GF16795@sentinelchicken.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Jan 2009 12:47:20 -0800
From: Tim <tim-security@...tinelchicken.org>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: FD / lists.grok.org - bad SSL cert

> It's *slightly* better, in that it guards against passive sniffing attacks
> on the data in transit. You're right that it doesn't guard against an
> active MITM attack.

How is that better, really?  Run tcpdump or ettercap...  Either of the
tools are off the shelf.  It doesn't take a great deal of skill for
either.  Just because a piece of software is doing an extra step or
three doesn't mean an attacker has to do significantly more work.  
O(1) + O(1) = O(1)

What modern networks don't permit active modification of packets in
realtime if you have the right access to the data?  I can conceive of
some hypothetical radio broadcast or other physical media which, if
carefully designed, could make MitM attacks difficult by virtue of the
media itself (along the lines of a poor man's quantum crypto line), but
I don't know of any in use.  Do enlighten me if you do.

cheers,
tim

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