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Message-Id: <E1LNtEe-0003vh-PO@titan.mandriva.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2009 11:16:00 -0700
From: security@...driva.com
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: [ MDVSA-2009:016 ] xen


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 _______________________________________________________________________

 Mandriva Linux Security Advisory                         MDVSA-2009:016
 http://www.mandriva.com/security/
 _______________________________________________________________________

 Package : xen
 Date    : January 16, 2009
 Affected: Corporate 4.0
 _______________________________________________________________________

 Problem Description:

 Ian Jackson found a security issue in the QEMU block device drivers
 backend that could allow a guest operating system to issue a block
 device request and read or write arbitrary memory locations, which
 could then lead to privilege escalation (CVE-2008-0928).
 
 It was found that Xen allowed unprivileged DomU domains to overwrite
 xenstore values which should only be changeable by the privileged
 Dom0 domain.  An attacker able to control a DomU domain could possibly
 use this flaw to kill arbitrary processes in Dom0 or trick a Dom0
 user into accessing the text console of a different domain running
 on the same host.  This update makes certain parts of xenstore tree
 read-only to unprivilged DomU domains (CVE-2008-4405).
 
 A vulnerability in the qemu-dm.debug script was found in how it
 created a temporary file in /tmp.  A local attacker in Dom0 could
 potentially use this flaw to overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink
 attack (CVE-2008-4993).  Since this script is not used in production,
 it has been removed from this update package.
 
 The updated packages have been patched to prevent these issues.
 _______________________________________________________________________

 References:

 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0928
 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-4405
 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-4993
 _______________________________________________________________________

 Updated Packages:

 Corporate 4.0:
 3785ed3cf9eaf4abb8842713706daeb3  corporate/4.0/i586/xen-3.0.1-3.2.20060mlcs4.i586.rpm 
 22f6a2eced04422519cbf734df73d453  corporate/4.0/SRPMS/xen-3.0.1-3.2.20060mlcs4.src.rpm

 Corporate 4.0/X86_64:
 450884c01338338d57834dd0b4947805  corporate/4.0/x86_64/xen-3.0.1-3.2.20060mlcs4.x86_64.rpm 
 22f6a2eced04422519cbf734df73d453  corporate/4.0/SRPMS/xen-3.0.1-3.2.20060mlcs4.src.rpm
 _______________________________________________________________________

 To upgrade automatically use MandrivaUpdate or urpmi.  The verification
 of md5 checksums and GPG signatures is performed automatically for you.

 All packages are signed by Mandriva for security.  You can obtain the
 GPG public key of the Mandriva Security Team by executing:

  gpg --recv-keys --keyserver pgp.mit.edu 0x22458A98

 You can view other update advisories for Mandriva Linux at:

  http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories

 If you want to report vulnerabilities, please contact

  security_(at)_mandriva.com
 _______________________________________________________________________

 Type Bits/KeyID     Date       User ID
 pub  1024D/22458A98 2000-07-10 Mandriva Security Team
  <security*mandriva.com>
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