| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-id: <200902251717.ace@psirt.cisco.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2009 17:15:00 +0100
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@...co.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Cc: psirt@...co.com
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities
in the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module and Cisco
ACE 4710 Application Control Engine
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in the Cisco ACE
Application Control Engine Module and Cisco ACE 4710 Application
Control Engine
Document ID: 109450
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20090225-ace
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2009 February 25 1600 UTC (GMT)
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
The Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module and Cisco ACE 4710
Application Control Engine Cisco ACE Module and Cisco ACE 4710
Application Control Engine contain multiple vulnerabilities that, if
exploited, can could result in any of the following impacts:
* Administrative level access via default user names and passwords
* Privilege escalation
* A denial of service (DoS) condition
Cisco has released free software updates available for affected
customers. Workarounds that mitigate some of the vulnerabilities are
available.
Note: These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. A device
may be affected by one vulnerability and not affected by another.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml
Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple
vulnerability disclosure advisory that impacts the Cisco 4700 Series
Application Control Engine Device Manager and Application Networking
Manager module software.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
The following table displays the products that are affected by each
vulnerability that is described within this advisory.
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| | Products and Versions |
| | Affected |
|Vulnerability |-----------------------------|
| | Cisco ACE | Cisco ACE |
| | 4710 | Module |
| | Appliance | |
|-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------|
| | All versions | All versions |
| Default Usernames and Passwords | prior to A1 | prior to A2 |
| | (8a) | (1.1) |
|-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------|
| | All versions | All versions |
| Privilege Escalation Vulnerability | prior to A1 | prior to A2 |
| | (8a) | (1.2) |
|-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------|
| | All versions | All versions |
| Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability | prior to A3 | prior to A2 |
| | (2.1) | (1.3) |
|-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------|
| Crafted Simple Network Management | All versions | All versions |
| Protocol version 2 (SNMPv2) Packet | prior to A3 | prior to A2 |
| Vulnerability | (2.1) | (1.3) |
|-------------------------------------+--------------+--------------|
| | All versions | All versions |
| Crafted SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerability | prior to A1 | prior to A2 |
| | (8.0) | (1.2) |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Determining Software Versions
+----------------------------
To display the version of system software that is currently running
on Cisco ACE Application Control Engine, use the show version
command. The following example displays the output of the show
version command on the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine software
version A3(1.0):
ACE-4710/Admin# show version
Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW)
TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac
Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by
other third parties and are used and distributed under license.
Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public
License. A copy of the license is available at
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
Software
loader: Version 0.95
system: Version A3(1.0) [build 3.0(0)A3(0.0.148) adbuild_03:31:25-2008/08/06_/auto/adbure_nightly2/nightly_rel_a3_1_0_throttle/REL_3_0_0_A3_0_0
system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.31/scimitar.bin
Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20080805:0415
...
<output truncated>
The following example displays the output of the show version command
on a Cisco ACE Application Control Engine module software version A1(1):
ACE-mod/Admin# show version
Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW)
TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac
Copyright (c) 2002-2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by
other third parties and are used and distributed under license.
Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public
License. A copy of the license is available at
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
Software
loader: Version 12.2[117]
system: Version 3.0(0)A1(1) [build 3.0(0)A1(1) _01:26:21-2006/03/13_/auto/adbu-rel/ws/REL_3_0_0_A1_1]
system image file: [LCP] disk0:c6ace-t1k9-mzg.3.0.0_A1_1.bin
licensed features: no feature license is installed
...
<output truncated>
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, the Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall,
and the Cisco ACE GSS 4400 Series Global Site Selector Appliances are
not affected by any of the vulnerabilities that are described in this
advisory. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected
by these vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
The Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine appliance and the Cisco
ACE Application Control Engine Module for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series
Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers are a load-balancing and
application-delivery solution for data centers. Multiple
vulnerabilities exist in both products. The following information
provides the details about each of the vulnerabilities that are
addressed in this advisory.
Default Usernames and Passwords
+------------------------------
Versions of the Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine appliance
prior to software version A1(8a) use default administrator, web
management, and device management account credentials. Similarly,
software versions of the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module
prior to software version A2(1.1) use default administrator and web
management credentials. The appliance and module do not prompt users
to modify system account passwords during the initial configuration
process. An attacker with knowledge of these accounts could modify
the application configuration and, in certain instances, gain user
access to the host operating system.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs and
have been assigned the following Common Vulnerability and Exposures
(CVE) IDs:
* Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module: CSCsq43828 (
registered customers only) - CVE-2009-0620
* Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance: CSCsq43229 (
registered customers only) - CVE-2009-0621
A third account is used for the Cisco 4700 Series Application Control
Engine Appliance Device Manager also uses default credentials. Only
the Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine appliance is affected
by this vulnerability. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug
ID CSCsq32379 ( registered customers only) and has also been assigned
the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0621.
Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
+---------------------------------
A vulnerability exists in versions of the Cisco ACE 4710 Application
Control Engine appliance prior to A1(8a) and the Cisco ACE
Application Control Engine Module prior to version A2(1.3). An
authenticated user could exploit this vulnerability to invoke
administrative commands via the device command line interface (CLI).
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs:
* Cisco ACE Application Control Engine ModuleACE Module: CSCsq48546
( registered customers only)
* Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance: CSCsq09839 (
registered customers only)
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and
Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0622.
Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability
+-------------------------------
A vulnerability exists in the Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control
Engine appliance prior to software version A3(2.1) and the Cisco ACE
Application Control Engine Module prior to software version A2(1.3).
An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause the device to
reload by sending a crafted SSH packet to it.
Note: SSH access must be configured on the affected device for it to
be vulnerable. SSH access is not enabled by default. A full TCP
three-way handshake is not necessary to trigger the effects of this
vulnerability.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs:
* Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module: CSCsv01877 (
registered customers only)
* Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance: CSCsv01738 (
registered customers only)
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and
Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0623.
Crafted SNMPv2c Packet Vulnerability
+-----------------------------------
A vulnerability exists in the Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control
Engine appliance prior to software version A3(2.1) and the Cisco ACE
Application Control Engine Module prior to software version A2(1.3).
An authenticated attacker could send a crafted SNMPv1 packet to an
affected device to cause it to reload.
Note: SNMPv2c must be explicitly configured in an affected device in
order to process any SNMPv2c transactions. SNMPv2c is not enabled by
default.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs:
* Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module: CSCsu36038 (
registered customers only)
* Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance: CSCsu47876 (
registered customers only)
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and
Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0624.
Crafted SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerability
+----------------------------------
A vulnerability exists in the Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control
Engine appliance prior to software version A1(8.0) and the Cisco ACE
Application Control Engine Module prior to software version A2(1.2).
An where an attacker may could cause the a device to reload by
sending a crafted SNMPv3 packet to it.
Note: SNMPv3 must be explicitly configured in an affected device in
order to process any SNMPv3 transactions. SNMPv3 is not enabled by
default.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs:
* Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module: CSCsq45432 (
registered customers only)
* Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine Appliance: CSCso83126 (
registered customers only)
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and
Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0625.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS
scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS
version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
CSCsq43828 and CSCsq43229 - Default users and passwords on ACE module
and appliance
CVSS Base Score - 10
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7
Exploitability - High
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCsq32379 - DM Default Account Credentials
CVSS Base Score - 10
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7
Exploitability - High
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCsq48546 and CSCsq09839 - Privilege escalation issue on ACE Module
and ACE Appliance
CVSS Base Score - 9
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - Single
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCsv01877 and CSCsv01738 - Crafted SSH packet may cause ACE module
or appliance to reload
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCsu36038 and CSCsu47876 - Crafted SNMPv2c packet may crash ACE
module and appliance
CVSS Base Score - 6.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Single
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 5.6
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCso83126 and CSCsq45432 - Crafted SNMPv3 packet may crash ACE
appliance
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
An attacker with knowledge of the Default Usernames and Passwords
Vulnerability accounts could modify the device configuration and, in
certain instances, gain user access to the host operating system.
An exploit of the Privilege Escalation Vulnerability could allow an
authenticated attacker to execute host operating system
administrative commands.
Successful exploitation of the Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability,
Crafted SNMPv2 Packet Vulnerability, and Crafted SNMPv3 Packet
Vulnerability may cause a reload of the affected device. Repeated
exploitation could result in a sustained DoS condition.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Each row of the software table (below) describes the earliest
possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated
date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the
"First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release"
column indicates the releases which have fixes for all the published
vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. A device running a
release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a
specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be
vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later
than the release in the "Recommended Releases" column of the table.
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| | Products and Versions Affected |
| |---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | Cisco ACE 4710 Appliance | Cisco ACE Module |
|Vulnerability |----------------------------------+----------------------------------|
| | First Fixed | Recommended | First | |
| | Release | Release | Fixed | Recommended Release |
| | | | Release | |
|------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------|
| Default Usernames and Passwords | A1(8a) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.1) | A2(1.3) |
|------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------|
| Privilege Escalation Vulnerability | A1(8a) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.2) | A2(1.3) |
|------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------|
| Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.3) | A2(1.3) |
|------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------|
| Crafted SNMPv2 Packet | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.3) | A2(1.3) |
| Vulnerability | | | | |
|------------------------------------+---------------+------------------+------------+---------------------|
| Crafted SNMPv2 Packet | A1(8.0) | A3(2.1) | A2(1.2) | A2(1.3) |
| Vulnerability | | | | |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco ACE module software can be downloaded from:
http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=280557289
Cisco ACE 4710 Application Control Engine appliance software can be
downloaded from:
http://tools.cisco.com/support/downloads/go/Redirect.x?mdfid=281222179
Workarounds
===========
This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities.
These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are
independent of each other.
Default Usernames and Passwords
+------------------------------
To change the default administrative password, use the username
command in configuration mode. The syntax of this command is as
follows:
username admin [password [0 | 5] {password}]
The keywords, arguments, and options are:
admin--Specifies the default administrative user name.
password--(Optional) Keyword that indicates that a password follows.
0--(Optional) Specifies a clear text password.
5--(Optional) Specifies an MD5-hashed strong encryption password.
password--The password in clear text, encrypted text, or MD5 strong
encryption, depending on the numbered option (0 or 5) that you enter.
If you do not enter a numbered option, the password is in clear text
by default. Enter a password as an unquoted text string with a
maximum of 64 characters.
For example, to create a user named admin that uses the clear text
password my_super_secret_88312, enter the following command:
ACE(config)# username admin password 0 my_super_secret_88312
Note: This process can also be followed to change the www user
account credentials. The dm user is for accessing the Device Manager
GUI and cannot be modified or deleted. The dm user is an internal
user required by the Device Manager GUI; it is hidden on the ACE CLI.
For more information refer to:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/app_ntwk_services/data_center_app_services/ace_appliances/vA3_1_0/configuration/virtualization/guide/config.html
Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
+---------------------------------
There are no workarounds for this vulnerability.
Crafted SSH Packet Vulnerability
+-------------------------------
SSH management traffic that can be received by the ACE is controlled
through the use of class maps, policy maps, and service policies.
This Management Traffic Service example denies unauthorized SSH
packets that are sent to an affected device. In the following
example, 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires
SSH access to the affected device. Care should be taken to allow all
required management access to the affected device. An attacker could
exploit this vulnerability using spoofed packets. This workaround
cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when
the attack comes from a trusted source address.
The following example demonstrates how SSH access to the ACE is only
allowed from the 192.168.100.1 host:
!-- Configure a class to allow SSH from the trusted source
!
class-map type management match-all Permit_SSH_Class
description Allow SSH from trusted sources Class
match protocol ssh source-address 192.168.100.1 255.255.255.255
!
!-- Configure a management policy that allows ssh from the
!--trusted source configured in the above class
!
policy-map type management first-match Permit_SSH_Policy
description Allow SSH from trusted sources Policy
class Permit_SSH_Class
permit
!
!-- Apply the management policy globally
!
service-policy input Permit_SSH_Policy
Additional information about "Configuring SSH Management Sessions" is
available at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/access.html#wp1049450
Additional information about "Configuring Class Maps and Policy Maps"
is available at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/mapolcy.html
warning Warning: It is possible to easily spoof the sender's IP
address, which may defeat class maps and access control lists (ACLs)
that permit communication to the device from trusted IP addresses.
Crafted SNMPv2 and SNMPv3 Packet Vulnerabilities
+-----------------------------------------------
SNMP management traffic that can be received by the ACE is controlled
through the use of class maps, policy maps, and service policies.
This Management Traffic Service example denies unauthorized SNMP
packets on UDP port 161 that are sent to an affected device. In the
following example, 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that
requires SNMP access to the affected device. Care should be taken to
allow all required management access to the affected device. An
attacker could exploit this vulnerability using spoofed packets. This
workaround cannot provide complete protection against this
vulnerability when the attack comes from a trusted source address.
!-- Configure a class to allow SNMP from the trusted source
!
class-map type management match-all Permit_SNMP_Class
description Allow SNMP from trusted sources Class
2 match protocol snmp source-address 192.168.100.1 255.255.255.255
!
!-- Configure a management policy that allows snmp from the
!--trusted source configured in the above class
!
policy-map type management first-match Permit_SNMP_Policy
description Allow SNMP from trusted sources Policy
class Permit_SNMP_Class
permit
!-- Apply the management policy globally
!
service-policy input Permit_SNMP_Policy
Additional information about "SNMP Management Traffic Services" is
available at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/snmp.html#wp1034011
Additional information about "Configuring Class Maps and Policy Maps"
is available at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A1/configuration/administration/guide/mapolcy.html
Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco
devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied
Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-ace.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt@...co.com or security-alert@...co.com for
software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco
service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@...co.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to
a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be
requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized
telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@...co.com
* first-bulletins@...ts.first.org
* bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@...nwatch.org
* cisco@...t.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
* full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@...sgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2009-February-25 | Initial public release |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin)
iEYEARECAAYFAkmlbsoACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uA9egCgiM1YYI9hZhS8iZ5kbEw6vxaq
gM8AnjpFAJaZ/RK593w/5j/mRHxjkLVo
=rWBu
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists