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Message-ID: <4A09FB14.4000300@idefense.com> Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 18:41:24 -0400 From: iDefense Labs <labs-no-reply@...fense.com> To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, vulnwatch@...nwatch.org, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk Subject: iDefense Security Advisory 05.12.09: Microsoft PowerPoint Build List Memory Corruption Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 iDefense Security Advisory 05.12.09 http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/ May 12, 2009 I. BACKGROUND Microsoft PowerPoint is an application used for constructing presentations, and comes with the Microsoft Office suite. For more information, see the vendor's site found at the following link. http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/powerpoint/default.aspx II. DESCRIPTION Remote exploitation of a memory corruption vulnerability in Microsoft Corp.'s PowerPoint could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the current user. The vulnerability occurs during the parsing of the BuildList record. This record is a container for other records that describe charts and diagrams in the PowerPoint file. By inserting multiple BuildList records with ChartBuild containers inside of them, it is possible to trigger a memory corruption vulnerability during the parsing of the ChartBuild container's contents. This allows an attacker to control an object pointer, which can lead to attacker supplied function pointers being dereferenced. III. ANALYSIS Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of the user opening the file. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to convince a user to open a malicious file. If the targeted user is running PowerPoint 2000, and the "Office Document Open Confirmation Tool" is not installed, then it is possible to exploit this vulnerability directly through the browser. Due to the nature of the vulnerability, relatively precise control of the process memory layout is needed to successfully exploit this vulnerability. iDefense Labs has developed exploit code that successfully exploits this vulnerability. IV. DETECTION iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in the following versions of PowerPoint: PowerPoint 2000 SP3 PowerPoint 2002 (XP) SP3 PowerPoint 2003 SP2 PowerPoint 2003 SP3 PowerPoint 2007 PowerPoint 2007 SP1 PowerPoint Viewer 2003 V. WORKAROUND Use Microsoft's moice tool to convert files to the new XML format. VI. VENDOR RESPONSE Microsoft has released a patch which addresses this issue. For more information, consult their advisory at the following URL: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS09-017.mspx VII. CVE INFORMATION The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2009-0224 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems. VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 10/06/2008 - Initial Contact 10/06/2008 - Initial Response 10/06/2008 - Researcher sent Inquiry to Vendor 10/07/2008 - Case number assigned 10/07/2008 - Initial resposne to Researcher Inquiry 12/12/2008 - Status Update Received - estimated release date 03/10/2009 02/24/2009 - Researcher restates Inquiry to Vendor 02/24/2009 - Status Update Received - estimated release date 06/09/2009 02/24/2009 - Vendor provides response to Inquiry 05/12/2009 - Coordinated Public Disclosure IX. CREDIT This vulnerability was discovered by Sean Larsson, iDefense Labs. Get paid for vulnerability research http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php Free tools, research and upcoming events http://labs.idefense.com/ X. LEGAL NOTICES Copyright © 2009 iDefense, Inc. Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please e-mail customerservice@...fense.com for permission. Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFKCfsSbjs6HoxIfBkRAowbAJ9zDkOUM15X5jJ9v6XEqkIzy2qmkwCfVMWU 0hS8cKkE4awCn4LhwK99Es4= =gpZa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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