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Message-ID: <4A09EA14.2010101@idefense.com> Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 17:28:52 -0400 From: iDefense Labs <labs-no-reply@...fense.com> To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, vulnwatch@...nwatch.org, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk Subject: iDefense Security Advisory 05.12.09: Microsoft PowerPoint 4.2 Conversion Filter Heap Corruption Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 iDefense Security Advisory 05.12.09 http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/ May 12, 2009 I. BACKGROUND Microsoft PowerPoint is an application used for constructing presentations, and comes with the Microsoft Office Suite. For more information, see the vendor's site found at the following link. http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/powerpoint/default.aspx II. DESCRIPTION Remote exploitation of a heap corruption vulnerability in Microsoft Corp.'s PowerPoint could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the current user. In particular, there is code that parses structures in the PowerPoint file. If the number of these structures is greater than a certain value, then memory corruption will occur. This memory corruption leads to the executing of arbitrary code. III. ANALYSIS Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary code with the privileges of the user opening the file. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to convince a user to open a malicious file. IV. DETECTION iDefense has confirmed the existence of these vulnerabilities in the following versions of PowerPoint: * PowerPoint 2000 SP3 * PowerPoint XP SP3 PowerPoint 2003 SP2 and SP3 contain the vulnerable code, but by default are unable to open PowerPoint 4.2 formatted files. This is due to the Office 2003 SP2/SP3 File Block Policy, which limits the file formats that Office applications will open without special permissions. If the targeted user has disabled the File Block Policy settings in PowerPoint 2003 SP3, then they are vulnerable. However, this is a non-default configuration. More on this policy can be found at the following URL. http://support.microsoft.com/kb/938810 Office 2007 and Office 2007 SP1 are not vulnerable to these issues. V. WORKAROUND Use the cacls program to deny access to the DLL containing the vulnerable code, PP4X32.DLL. This will prevent the vulnerable DLL from loading in PowerPoint, which will also prevent users from importing PowerPoint 4.0 files. If Office 2003 SP3 is being used, then the default behavior is to block the opening of PowerPoint 4.0 files. If the default behavior has been changed, restoring it is an effective workaround. VI. VENDOR RESPONSE iDefense is currently working with the vendor to address this issue. Since there is no vendor fix at this time, please handle this information with sensitivity. VII. CVE INFORMATION The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2009-0223 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems. VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 02/24/2009 - Initial Contact 02/24/2009 - Initial Response 02/24/2009 - PoC Requested 03/05/2009 - PoC Sent 03/06/2009 - Vendor requests clarification - cannot reproduce 04/03/2009 - Vendor Case # 9037 set 04/23/2009 - Requested CVE from Vendor 04/23/2009 - Vendor set disclosure date of June 9 05/12/2009 - Coordinated Public Disclosure IX. CREDIT This vulnerability was reported to iDefense by Marsu. Get paid for vulnerability research http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php Free tools, research and upcoming events http://labs.idefense.com/ X. LEGAL NOTICES Copyright © 2009 iDefense, Inc. Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please e-mail customerservice@...fense.com for permission. Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFKCeoSbjs6HoxIfBkRAmRRAKDQXtPXSNKjKbK2P0XrdmWP8FgmlgCeJoep bMFtPgt1UqA3ocdQaDYAnMA= =Cr5S -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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