[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <cd1bdfdd0906061839h51eeb05ej2d06673febb9563d@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2009 18:39:55 -0700
From: "Arian J. Evans" <arian.evans@...chronic.com>
To: Chris Weber <chris@...abasec.com>
Cc: Stephen de Vries <stephen@...steddelight.org>,
Full-Disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>,
websecurity@...appsec.org
Subject: Re: [WEB SECURITY] Unicode Left/Right Pointing
Double Angel Quotation Mark bypass?
On Sat, Jun 6, 2009 at 5:43 PM, Chris Weber<chris@...abasec.com> wrote:
> Your discussion point #2 seems to digress, talking about the confusables and
> lookalikes don't seem to lend to the original subject. Unless, you're
> suggesting that they somehow add to the canonicalization of strings that
> White Hat is seeing?
Yes, that is exactly what I am saying.
It is much easier to inject a CAST or a SELECT past a blacklist if
there are multiple characters canonicalized to As and Es in the
application.
And the same goes for things like double-quotes. Many (most?) language
character sets have confusables and false-familiars with U000/001
Unicode, and Latin/ASCII, and sometimes they are canonicalized as
such.
I have nothing that tells me, when I see a character conversion, if it
is a "best fit" mapping or an attempt to canonicalize confusables or
avoid name collision. So I put them all in the same bucket in terms of
security measurement/classification.
A developer using unicode would probably not put them in the same bucket.
-ae
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists