full-disclosure - Re: When is it valid to claim that a vulnerability leads to a remote attack?

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Message-ID: <c83481820910111726o6663bf15n8c4795f4e6f321fb@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2009 20:26:13 -0400
From: Jeremy Brown <0xjbrown41@...il.com>
To: James Matthews <nytrokiss@...il.com>, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: When is it valid to claim that a
	vulnerability leads to a remote attack?

What are your thoughts on an exploit for a client that connects to a
(malicious) service through the network? I certainly wouldn't call it
a local attack...

On Sun, Oct 11, 2009 at 8:18 PM, James Matthews <nytrokiss@...il.com> wrote:
> If you classify a remote bug (anything that can be exploited remotely) then
> you are classifying all bugs (you can use a privilege escalation exploit
> remotely) I agree with Thor, anything that exploits a remote service
> (HTTP,FTP Etc..) without any user interaction.
>
> On Sun, Oct 11, 2009 at 12:54 AM, Thor (Hammer of God)
> <thor@...merofgod.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> > I  think we can agree that yes, it is remotely exploitable and as such
>> > should be categorized as "remote" in Risk/Impactt scoring systems ?
>> >
>> > Does anybody disagree ? I'd be interested to hear your point of view.
>>
>> Hey Thierry - I hope all is well...
>>
>> I'm happy to include "user assisted remote exploitation" as a "remote"
>> vulnerability in academic conversations, but I don't categorize it as
>> "remote" when assessing overall risk to a particular threat in production
>> environments.  Like everyone else, my TMs include impact and skill required
>> to exploit a particular vulnerability; but they also include "likelihood of
>> exploitation."   While that may sound like a wildcard metric, I quantify it
>> by applying the internal controls in place that may mitigate a particular
>> attack.  In "my" networks (networks I control, design, or consult for) most
>> users couldn't execute [common] exploits even if they wanted to.  I won't
>> bore you with the controls I deploy as I'm confident you are well aware of
>> the options one has, but the fact they exist at all place "user assisted
>> remote exploits" in a different category for me when assessing risk.  When
>> the propensity for a vulnerability to be exploited lies in a particular
>> user's response to any given
>>  trigger, as opposed to any authoritative in-place controls to mitigate
>> exposure, then a model's relevant response options are greatly diminished
>> (IMO).
>>
>> As such, I choose to categorize "remote" exploits as those that may be
>> executed against a given host that is autonomously running a [vulnerable]
>> service that can be connected to by some (any) other network client, device,
>> or service for the purposes of ascertaining overall risk.
>>
>> t
>>
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>
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Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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