full-disclosure - Sprint / Verizon MiFi CSRF+CSS Gives up GPS info to attacker

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Message-ID: <4B509400.5060503@ngenuity-is.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2010 11:12:48 -0500
From: "Adam Baldwin" <adam_baldwin@...nuity-is.com>
To: <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>,
	<bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Sprint / Verizon MiFi CSRF+CSS Gives up GPS info
	to attacker

The MiFi by Novatel Wireless (re-branded and sold by multiple vendors
such as Sprint and Verizon) is a mobile wifi hotspot. The mifi also has
a built in GPS to provide location based searching.

Turns out that the web interface to this little device has a lot going
on that can be exploited, from gaining the user’s GPS data to
terminating the user’s connectivity. The POC isn't online yet due to
vendor lag but it's not all that complicated if you have a MiFi and a
few minutes.

*1. Authentication not required.*

The MiFi does not require a valid session to commit changes to
configuration settings. This makes exploiting the below issues a lot
easier when you don’t have to require that the victim have a valid session.

*2. Enable GPS without the users knowledge.*

The GPS on a MiFi can be enabled by visiting the following URL.
Depending on the situation the victim may get a alert that says “Login
Required” but if they are like the typical user they will simply click
on it and forget it ever happened.

*3. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)*

The web interface does not validate referrer or use any magical tokens
to protect against CSRF. This means that we can have a victim visit our
malicious website and do evil things like change the wireless settings
of the MiFi.

*4. Output Encoding
*

In multiple locations of the MiFi web interface user input is not
properly encoded when output back to the user. One interesting location
is the key field for the wifi settings. I’m wondering why the hell
somebody thought it was a good idea to print the wifi key in clear text
back to the user, and in this case it’s not properly encoded either
giving us a nice 63 character persistent injection point for script.

So for those that weren’t paying attention: Any MiFi user that visits a
specially crafted page will give up their GPS location to the attacker.

Here is a video clip for the Sprint MiFi (latest firmware) of the
working proof of concept.
http://evilpacket.net/2010/jan/14/mifi-geopwn/

Download attachment "winmail.dat" of type "application/ms-tnef" (3041 bytes)

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