full-disclosure - Re: Risk measurements

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <03b301caac1b$30ce2070$926a6150$@wright@Information-Defense.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 06:40:07 +1100
From: "Craig S. Wright" <craig.wright@...ormation-Defense.com>
To: <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>,
	"'Christian Sciberras'" <uuf6429@...il.com>
Cc: "'McGhee, Eddie'" <Eddie.McGhee@....com>,
	'full-disclosure' <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>,
	security-basics@...urityfocus.com,
	"'Thor \(Hammer of God\)'" <Thor@...merofgod.com>
Subject: Re: Risk measurements

Exactly,
As Valdis has stated, we want economic optimality. Valdis has stated this in
a far easier to understand manner than I.

I will publish a financial model on the blog this weekend that displays the
relationships graphically.

Regards,
...
Dr. Craig S Wright <http://gse-compliance.blogspot.com/>  GSE-Malware,
GSE-Compliance, LLM, & ...
Information Defense <http://www.information-defense.com/>  Pty Ltd

_____________________________________________
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu [mailto:Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu] 
Sent: Friday, 12 February 2010 11:31 PM
To: Christian Sciberras
Cc: craig.wright@...ormation-defense.com; McGhee, Eddie; full-disclosure;
security-basics@...urityfocus.com; Thor (Hammer of God)
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Risk measurements

* PGP Signed by an unknown key

On Fri, 12 Feb 2010 13:09:55 +0100, Christian Sciberras said:

> There's a time for finding fancy interesting numbers and a time to get
> the system going with the least flaws possible.

You don't want "the least flaws possible".  We can get very close to zero
flaws per thousand lines of code - but the result ends up costing hundreds
of dollars per line.  You want "the most economical number of flaws" - if
you get it down to 10 flaws, and the next flaw will cost you $750,000 to
fix,
but you estimate your loss as $500,000 if you don't fix it and get hacked,
why are you spending $250,000 extra to fix the flaw?

> Why should any entity bother with risk modeling if it is not used at all?
> Here's the real question to the subject; What does risk modeling fix?

Risk modeling is what tells you the flaw will cost $500K to not fix.
And since you totally screw the pooch if you got it wrong and not fixing
it costs $1M, people like to do a good job of risk modelling.

* Unknown Key
* 0xB4D3D7B0

Content of type "text/html" skipped

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/