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Message-ID: <4B8594EF.2080903@idefense.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2010 16:06:55 -0500
From: iDefense Labs <labs-no-reply@...fense.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, vulnwatch@...nwatch.org,
full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: iDefense Security Advisory 02.23.10: Multiple
Vendor NOS Microsystems getPlus Downloader Input Validation Vulnerability
iDefense Security Advisory 02.23.10
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Feb 23, 2010
I. BACKGROUND
The getPlus Downloader is an application download and installation
manager, distributed in the form of an ActiveX control. This control is
used by Adobe Systems Inc. to install Adobe Reader through the Adobe
website when Internet Explorer is used. Part of the functionality of
the getPlus Downloader is to download and execute applications from
preconfigured sites; in the case of Adobe, from adobe.com and its
subdomains. For more information, see the vendor's site found at the
following link.
http://www.nosltd.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=38&Itemid=26
II. DESCRIPTION
Remote exploitation of an input validation vulnerability in NOS
Microsystems Ltd.'s getPlus Download Manager, as used by Adobe and
potentially other vendors, could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary
code with the privileges of the current user.
The vulnerability exists due to improper validation of the domain used
to download and execute applications from. The vulnerable code always
assumes that the domain being validated is a subdomain, which can lead
to a logic error when comparing the valid domain and the requested
domain.
III. ANALYSIS
Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary
code with the privileges of the user viewing the web page. To exploit
this vulnerability, a targeted user must load a malicious webpage
created by an attacker. An attacker typically accomplishes this via
social engineering or injecting content into compromised, trusted
sites. After the user visits the malicious web page, no further user
interaction is needed.
IV. DETECTION
iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in getPlus
version 1.5.2.35 as distributed by Adobe. The Adobe Download Manager on
Windows (prior to February 23, 2010) has been confirmed vulnerable by
Adobe.
V. WORKAROUND
Setting the killbit for CLSID 'CF40ACC5-E1BB-4aff-AC72-04C2F616BCA7'
will prevent this control from loading in Internet Explorer.
VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
Adobe Systems Inc. has released a solution which addresses this issue.
Information about downloadable vendor updates can be found by clicking
on the URLs shown.
http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb10-08.html
VII. CVE INFORMATION
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2010-0189 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
06/09/2009 Initial Vendor Notification
06/09/2009 Initial Vendor Reply
02/23/2010 Coordinated Public Disclosure
IX. CREDIT
This vulnerability was reported to iDefense by Yorick Koster.
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http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php
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http://labs.idefense.com/
X. LEGAL NOTICES
Copyright © 2010 iDefense, Inc.
Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail customerservice@...fense.com for permission.
Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.
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