full-disclosure - Re: Compliance Is Wasted Money, Study Finds

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Date: Wed, 07 Apr 2010 12:43:47 -0400
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To: Keith Tomler <ktomler@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>,
	security-basics@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Compliance Is Wasted Money, Study Finds

On Wed, 07 Apr 2010 10:24:00 EDT, Keith Tomler said:
> BALONEY

> As an Information Systems Auditor, it seems that if you have a valid
> finding and a reasonable recommendation, management usually doesn't
> act on it.

> However, if you have the same finding and recommendation and then cite
> a regulation, management is forced to act upon it.

> I believe that the regulations were drafted in order to force entities
> into doing what they should have done in the first place.

I think the issue is a bit deeper than that - the way most regulations are
drafted, they do *not* force entities to do what they should have done in
the first place.

What they *do* force is implementing a checkbox.

Whether said checkbox is actually the best solution *for the actual problem*
is the issue.  I've seen cases where checkbox auditors insisted that a
certain critical system "absolutely positively *HAD* to have a firewall".

Even though the the owners of the system were *more* paranoid, and had
done an even more thorough securing of the system by not even having a
network connection to the machine.

> I should not have to cite regulations in order to make sure logs are
> being reviewed,

Now stop for a moment - what is the *reason* for logs being reviewed?

Is it acceptable to *not* review logs if there's a suitable "throw alert
on exception" mechanism in place?

Which is actually more long-term cost effective security for the organization?

That's the problem with most of the regulations - they enforce checkboxes,
not actually dealing with the overall security posture in a sane way.

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