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Message-Id: <20100526045125.C18C628043@smtp.hushmail.com>
Date: Wed, 26 May 2010 00:51:25 -0400
From: "Elazar Broad" <elazar@...hmail.com>
To: bipin.gautam@...il.com, valdis.kletnieks@...edu
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Stealthier Internet access
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Thermite will definitely do, checkout
http://hackaday.com/2008/09/16/how-to-thermite-based-hard-drive-
anti-forensic-destruction/ and of course a .50 APIT round will do
as well:
http://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/diskcrypt
/index.html.
elazar
On Tue, 25 May 2010 16:08:45 -0400 Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu wrote:
>On Wed, 26 May 2010 01:25:25 +0545, Bipin Gautam said:
>
>Rest of article actually looks good at first glance, but this
>jumped out at me:
>
>> > -Software disk Wiping:
>> > Wipe KEY, header of your encrypted storage volume (first few
>mb, ref
>> > specific manual) Ref using Peter Gutmann standard of data
>wipeing (35
>> > wipes)
>> > And wipe entire storage using U.S. DoD 5200.28-STD (7 wipes)
>
>There is zero evidence that anybody is able to recover data after
>even a
>single overwrite of /dev/zero on a disk drive made this century.
>Even in
>the MFM days, Gutmann's recovery technique was difficult - today's
>densities
>render it essentially impossible. Even if it's possible, if your
>threat model
>includes the sort of organizations that could theoretically do it,
>maybe you
>should be considering thermite rather than software wipes.
>Especially if
>they're pounding on your door. ;)
>
>I'm more than open to hear of any *confirmed* cases of data
>recovered after
>even a single overwrite anytime after 1995. To date, I have not
>seen one.
>Prove me wrong, guys. ;)
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