lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Sun, 30 May 2010 10:47:29 -0700
From: <>
To: "Thor \(Hammer of God\)" <>
Cc: "" <>
Subject: Re: Websense Enterprise 6.3.3 Policy Bypass

Chaining downstream proxies to ISA and requiring Windows Integrated Auth
has been an issue for a long time (it generally breaks the chain, so
that fixes the bypass problem right there), but frankly I'm guessing.

Windows Auth brings a lot of incompatibilities with it.  I wouldn't
recommend it unless it was absolutely required, but its
proxy-chain-breaking properties are legendary.

The ISA server will continue to log, even though Websense won't, so you
do have that.  But ISA won't filter, so you're back to square one.   And
comparing the two databases for discrepancies can get ugly.  By the time
you get around to comparing the databases, the damage has already been
done.  It becomes a forensics exercise at that point.

What I think is going on here is either:

A) The Websense ISA plug-in sees that the request has come in by proxy
and assumes it has already been filtered by the originating proxy


B) ISA sees the request has come in by proxy and therefore doesn't send
the request to the Websense ISA plug-in for filtering.

If it's "B", then it's a Microsoft issue and it may never get fixed (and
it becomes marketing bullet point for ISA Server TMG).  

If the same problem occurs in a SQUID integration of Websense 6.3.3,
then it's definitely "A".  

I have a feeling Websense fixed it in the 7.x series, so they're
probably not motivated to fix it in 6.x.  Again, I don't have the
resources to test that theory (and I asked Dan Hubbard politely for a
temporary license for research purposes).

My hunch is they did fix it in 7.x because they pretty much ignored me
after the first e-mail I sent back in October 2009.

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: RE: [Full-disclosure] Websense Enterprise 6.3.3 Policy Bypass
From: "Thor (Hammer of God)" <>
Date: Sun, May 30, 2010 12:30 pm
To: "" <>,
"" <>

Adding "Via:" completely bypasses monitoring too?? That is bad. I've
never used Websense, so pardon my ignorance, but this wouldn't apply to
with ISA's native monitoring and logging, so I'm just curious about
what's going on under the covers. "Via:" bypassing the filter is "not
good" but bypassing monitoring (and presumably logging) is really bad.
Nice find.

I am curious as to what your thoughts are regarding Windows Auth as a
mitigation. While it's nice that ISA could help solve a problem with
Websense, I'm don't see how that would work. How would requiring auth
solve Websense's inability to filter "Via:" headers?


>-----Original Message-----
>From: [mailto:full-disclosure-
>] On Behalf Of
>Sent: Saturday, May 29, 2010 8:25 PM
>Subject: [Full-disclosure] Websense Enterprise 6.3.3 Policy Bypass
>discovered by mrhinkydink
>PRODUCT: Websense Enterprise v6.3.3
>EXPOSURE: Trivial Web Policy Bypass
>By adding a "Via:" header to an HTTP request it is possible for a user to
>completely bypass filtering and monitoring in a Websense Enterprise
>6.3.3/Microsoft ISA Server (2004 or 2006) proxy integration environment.
>The following works in a Websense 6.3.3 Enterprise system using the ISA
>Server integration product and transparent authentication. It is assumed it will
>work with other proxy integration products, but this has not been tested.
>I. Install Firefox >= 3.5
>II. Obtain and install the Modify Headers plug-in by Gareth Hunt
>III. Configure the plug-in to add a valid "Via:" header to every request
>Example: "Via: 1.1 VIAPROXY"
>IV. Browse to a filtered Web site
>V. All content is allowed without monitoring
>The Modify Headers plug-in does not work with SSL. However, in practice a
>user could browse to a so-called (by Websense) "Proxy Avoidance" Web site
>and use the SSL capabilities of the remote proxy.
>Properly configured, a downstream SQUID proxy can send requests to the
>upstream ISA server and all requests will pass through without blocking or
>monitoring. No evidence of activity will be logged by Websense. This was in
>fact how this vulnerability was originally discovered.
>Considering the simplicity of the attack, the author suspects this bypass
>technique is already well-known in certain circles.
>Also, it is trivial to modify proxy-enabled Linux utilities to leverage this bypass.
>The author has recompiled (that is, HACKED) OpenVPN, connect-proxy,
>PuTTY, stunnel, and others to take advantage of this policy bypass.
>Obviously, the risk of undetected (by Websense, at least) covert tunnels is
>high in a vulnerable installation of this product.
>Linux platforms using this method in this specific environment will also enjoy
>bypassing Websense's transparent authentication requirement.
>For this specific installation scenario (Websense 6.3.3 + ISA 2004/6 +
>transparent authentication), none are known. The following may work:
>* Use Windows Integrated Authentication on the ISA Server
>* Upgrade to Websense 7.x
>* Do not use a proxy integration product
>10/09/2009 - vendor notified
>05/29/2010 - PoC published
>c. MMX mrhinkydink
>Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>Hosted and sponsored by Secunia -

Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia -

Powered by blists - more mailing lists