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Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2010 09:49:11 -0400
From: T Biehn <tbiehn@...il.com>
To: Walter van Holst <walter.van.holst@...all.nl>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
Subject: Re: No anti-virus software? No internet connection

I wonder if someone writes down all that pseudo-intellectual philosophical
bullshit that is so carefully crafted by FD members (myself included)?
Maybe I should:
???
Profit

-Travis

On Thu, Jun 24, 2010 at 5:45 AM, Walter van Holst <
walter.van.holst@...all.nl> wrote:

> On Thu, June 24, 2010 11:08, Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu wrote:
>
> >> The answer to that kind of question is quite often related to the
> >> industry average. For example no more failures than one standard
> >> deviation below the industry average.
> >
> > Ahh.. but that doesn't really help either.  Consider that not all
> > failures
> > are created equal.  Should a failure to detect some unknown basically
> > harmless
> > strain that's only been seen on 4 machines in Zimbabwe count the same
> > as
> > failing to notice that a machine is still infected with Code Red or
> > something
> > that's virulent and malicious and on a very large current burn?  Do
> > you even
> > care it didn't detect the Zimbabwe strain your machine has never been
> > exposed to?
>
> Of course any way of measuring it will be fundamentally flawed in
> certain ways. There is always that pesky 80/20 or 90/10 rule. And you
> can of course figure out a way of correcting for corner cases, but
> that will only create additional corner cases. That's what makes
> lawyering on product liability a craft at best and usually some form
> of black magic.
>
> > For that matter, do you really want to create a situation where the
> > various
> > A/V companies now have an *incentive* to make sure their competitors
> > don't
> > detect something (either by failing to share data, or resorting to
> > having
> > malware custom-crafted)?  The only reason the whole A/V industry
>
> And yes, there may very well be unintended consequences. Nonetheless,
> I feel the era of complete exoneration from product liability is
> coming to an end for packaged software. Especially in the security
> industry. It is just a matter of an 'unsafe at any speed' moment
> occurring and there will be legislation, however braindead such
> legislation may be from an engineering viewpoint.
>
> Call me a pessimist, but we've been putting way too much critical
> stuff on internet connected systems while at the same neglecting basic
> hygiene at every level not to have some disaster to happen. It isn't
> so much a question of if but when that will happen.
>
> Regards,
>
>  Walter
>
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