full-disclosure - Re: Chrome and Safari users open to stealth HTML5 Application Cache attack

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Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2010 15:41:27 -0700
From: Chris Evans <scarybeasts@...il.com>
To: Dan Kaminsky <dan@...para.com>
Cc: Lavakumar Kuppan <lava@...labs.org>, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Chrome and Safari users open to stealth HTML5
	Application Cache attack

On Mon, Jun 28, 2010 at 1:30 PM, Dan Kaminsky <dan@...para.com> wrote:
>
>> In summary, any http hit on an insecure network is dangerous on all
>> browsers.
>> (FWIW, Chromium resolves this for me. When I type mail<enter> into the
>> omnibar, it auto-completes to https://mail.google.com/)
>>
>
> Actually, I see this as a legitimate gap.  HTTP links don't cache-mix with
> HTTPS links, and cookies can have server-side integrity checking to prevent
> HTTP pollution (lets not talk about the secure tag for cookies), but if it
> is indeed the case that there is no way to have a HTTPS-exclusive
> Application Cache, then that is a feature killing bug that's been
> legitimately called out.

Eh? Lava's attack poisons a plain HTTP resource. As per "regular"
caching, Application Cache is supposed to separate the effects of HTTP
and HTTPS responses.


Cheers
Chris

>
> --Dan
>
>

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