full-disclosure - Re: [GOATSE SECURITY] Clench: Goatse's way to say "screw you" to certificate authorities

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Message-ID: <AANLkTi=8umnzEys6P32eE7EZptD3aLoCKaUfUSekteSh@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2010 22:37:33 +0200
From: Christian Sciberras <uuf6429@...il.com>
To: Tim <tim-security@...tinelchicken.org>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [GOATSE SECURITY] Clench: Goatse's way to say
 "screw you" to certificate authorities

> However, why don't we have server certificates with multiple
> independent CA signatures?

Tim, I find that concept very interesting.

Cheers,
Chris.

On Wed, Sep 8, 2010 at 10:34 PM, Tim <tim-security@...tinelchicken.org> wrote:
>> > I'd rather have a company pay some good bucks to get their hands on a
>> > highly trusted certificate than kids who's aim in life is wiping as
>> > much hard disks as possible.
>> > Which also answers why those $10-$20 assholes does a better job than
>> > the kids we all know about...
>>
>> Same. I would rather trust a large company that doesn't care about
>> anything except for my cash, instead of developing a different framework
>> that is not based around money.
>
> I think you're on to something there, in that if a company's business
> model were completely built on trust, then they would actually want to
> protect that and not give up keys to governments.
>
> However, why don't we have server certificates with multiple
> independent CA signatures?  From there, browsers/clients could be
> written to be more suspicious of single-signature Sub-CAs signed by
> CAs that aren't considered as safe/trustworthy (based on whatever
> political prejudices you choose).
>
> SSL PKI won't work if it's as flexible as PGP's web of trust, but
> there's no reason it needs to be as fragile as it is now.
>
> tim
>
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