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Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2010 11:28:25 +0530
From: Shirish Padalkar <shirish.padalkar@....com>
To: Ryan Sears <rdsears@....edu>
Cc: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>,
	full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Filezilla's silent caching of user's
	credentials

http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy&hl=en&site=&source=hp&q=inurl:recentservers.xml&oq=inurl:recentservers.xml

:)



From:
Ryan Sears <rdsears@....edu>
To:
full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Date:
10/08/2010 08:52 AM
Subject:
[Full-disclosure] Filezilla's silent caching of user's credentials
Sent by:
full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk



Hi all,

As some of you may or may not be aware, the popular (and IMHO one of the 
best) FTP/SCP program Filezilla caches your credentials for every host you 
connect to, without either warning or ability to change this without 
editing an XML file. There have been quite a few bug and features requests 
filed, and they all get closed or rejected within a week or so. I also 
posted something in the developer forum inquiring about this, and received 
this response:

"I do not see any harm in storing credentials as long as the rest of your 
system is properly secure as it should be."

Source:(http://forum.filezilla-project.org/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=17932)

To me this is not only concerning, but also completely un-acceptable. The 
passwords all get stored in PLAIN TEXT within your %appdata% directory in 
an XML file. This is particularly dangerous in multi-user environments 
with local profiles, because as we all know physical access to a computer 
means it's elementary at best to acquire information off it. Permissions 
only work if your operating system chooses to respect them, not to mention 
how simple it is *even today* to maliciously get around windows networks 
using pass-the-hash along with network token manipulation techniques.

There has even been a bug filed that draws out great ways to 
psudo-mitigate this using built-in windows API calls, but it doesn't seem 
to really be going anywhere. This really concerns me because a number of 
my coworkers and friends were un-aware of this behavior, and I didn't even 
know about it until I'd been using it for a year or so. All I really want 
to see is at the very least just some warning that Filezilla does this. 

Filezilla bug report:(http://trac.filezilla-project.org/ticket/5530)

My feelings have been said a lot more eloquently than I could ever hope to 
in that bug report:

"Whoever keeps closing this issue and/or dismissing its importance 
understands neither security nor logical argument. I apologize for the 
slam, but it is undeniably true. Making the same mistake over and over 
does not make it any less of a mistake. The fact that a critical 
deficiency has existed for years does not make it any less critical a 
deficiency. Similarly, the fact that there are others (pidgin) who indulge 
in the same faulty reasoning does not make the reasoning any more sound." 
~btrower

While it's true you can mitigate this behavior, why should it even be 
enabled by default? The total lapse in security for such a feature-rich, 
robust piece of software is quite disturbing, and I don't understand how 
the developers don't think this is an issue. 

I just wanted to gauge the FD community on this issue, because with enough 
backing and explanation from the security community as to why this is a 
problem, this issue may finally be resolved (it's been doing this for 
years now). 

Regards,
Ryan Sears

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