full-disclosure - Re: Mail Insecure TLS Usage For SMTPS

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Message-Id: <A9317287-5D69-4E59-B244-3E2CD2B58AA3@sabahattin-gucukoglu.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 06:48:50 +0000
From: Sabahattin Gucukoglu <mail@...ahattin-gucukoglu.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Mail Insecure TLS Usage For SMTPS

Just FYI, Apple responds to my concerns:

> After examining your report we do not see any actual security implications.  Mac OS X can locate missing intermediate certificates by finding them in a keychain or by using the "CA Issuers" field of the "Certificate Authority Information Access" extension in the certificate.  One of these will succeed because your certificate does have the "CA Issuers" field.  Once the intermediate has been found, a complete certificate chain can be built and Mail will accept the certificate as valid.

And, yes, that field really specifies the missing piece in the chain as a URI to the PEM-encoded intermediate certificate.

So that's okay then.  And really, quite cool. :-)

Cheers,
Sabahattin

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