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Message-ID: <AANLkTinjE+CJ0LXwxm=K2smtiN-ph75QJS=NLog1e254@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2010 22:04:57 +0900
From: Dan Kaminsky <dan@...para.com>
To: Georgi Guninski <guninski@...inski.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: verizon vs m$
> -----
> Finally, Microsoft and other software vendors should clearly document which features do and do not
> have associated security claims. Clearly stating which features make security claims, and which do not,
> will allow informed decisions to be made on IT security issues.
> -----
>>From 2007:
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/021407-microsoft-uac-not-a-security.html
"Vista makes tradeoffs between security and convenience, and both UAC
and Protected Mode IE have design choices that required paths to be
opened in the IL wall for application compatibility and ease of use,"
he wrote.
Because the boundaries defined by UAC and Protected Mode IE are
designed to be porous, they can't really be considered security
barriers, he said. "Neither UAC elevations nor Protected Mode IE
define new Windows security boundaries," Russinovich wrote. "Because
elevations and ILs don’t define a security boundary, potential avenues
of attack, regardless of ease or scope, are not security bugs."
He said Microsoft had communicated this in the past, but that the
point needed reiterating.
(Note that Russinovich is properly cited in the Verizon Business
report -- just pointing out that this has come up before.)
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