Message-ID: <23162e8b$2c82aefa$75e1ea6f$@com>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2010 18:13:24 -0800
From: "StenoPlasma @ ExploitDevelopment" <StenoPlasma@...loitdevelopment.com>
To: "Thor (Hammer of God)" <thor@...merofgod.com>,
	"full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching
	Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate
	Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)

T,

My article describes how to use the SECURITY registry hive to trick the 
Microsoft operating system in to performing an action that has a result 
that is not intended by the software developer.  This action is performed 
on the Active Directory logon account cache that regular local 
administrators should not have access to.  There are always other ways of 
doing things when it comes to this type of work.


Thank you,

-----------------------------------------------------
StenoPlasma at ExploitDevelopment.com  
www.ExploitDevelopment.com
-----------------------------------------------------

-------- Original Message --------
> From: "Thor (Hammer of God)" <thor@...merofgod.com>
> Sent: Thursday, December 09, 2010 6:07 PM
> To: "stenoplasma@...loitdevelopment.com" 
<stenoplasma@...loitdevelopment.com>, "full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk" 
<full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
> Subject: RE: [Full-disclosure] Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching 
Allows Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and 
Login as Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)
> 
> Why all the trouble?  Just change the log files directly when logged in 
as the local admin.  It's a whole lot simpler, and you don't even need the 
domain administrator to have interactively logged into your workstation.  
Or is your point that local administrators are, um, local administrators?
> 
> t
> 
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk 
[mailto:full-disclosure-
> >bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of StenoPlasma @
> >www.ExploitDevelopment.com
> >Sent: Thursday, December 09, 2010 5:07 PM
> >To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com; full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
> >Cc: stenoplasma@...loitdevelopment.com
> >Subject: [Full-disclosure] Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching 
Allows
> >Local Workstation Admins to Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login 
as
> >Cached Domain Admin Accounts (2010-M$-002)
> >
> 
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------


> >www.ExploitDevelopment.com 2010-M$-002
> 
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------


> >
> >TITLE:
> >Flaw in Microsoft Domain Account Caching Allows Local Workstation Admins 
to
> >Temporarily Escalate Privileges and Login as Cached Domain Admin 
Accounts
> >
> >SUMMARY AND IMPACT:
> >All versions of Microsoft Windows operating systems allow real-time
> >modifications to the Active Directory cached accounts listing stored on 
all
> >Active Directory domain workstations and servers. This allows domain 
users
> >that have local administrator privileges on domain assets to modify 
their
> >cached accounts to masquerade as other domain users that have logged in 
to
> >those domain assets. This will allow local administrators to 
temporarily
> >escalate their domain privileges on domain workstations or servers. If 
the local
> >administrator masquerades as an Active Directory Domain Admin account, 
the
> >modified cached account is now free to modify system files and user 
account
> >profiles using the identity of the Domain Admin's account. This 
includes
> >creating scripts to run as the Domain Admin account the next time that 
they
> >log in. All files created will not be linked to your domain account in 
file and
> >folder access lists. All security access lists will only show the Domain 
Admin's
> >account once you log out of the modified cached account. This leads to 
a
> >number of security issues that I will not attempt to identify in the 
article. One
> >major issue is the lack of non-repudiation. Editing files and other 
actions will
> >be completed as another user account. Event log entries for object 
access will
> >only be created if administrators are auditing successful access to 
files (This
> >will lead to enormous event log sizes).
> >
> >DETAILS:
> >Prerequisites to exploit:
> >
> >#1: The user has a "Domain User" account that has administrative 
privileges on
> >his/her workstation (This is a common configuration for both small and
> >enterprise networks).
> >#2: The Microsoft Windows Active Directory domain has not disabled the 
use
> >of Group Policy "Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache 
(in
> >case domain controller is not available)". The default value for this 
setting is
> >"10 logons".
> >#3: A domain/enterprise/schema/privileged administrator has logged in to 
the
> >user's workstation at any time in the past (It would be very difficult 
to not
> >have some type of admin from the domain login to a workstation for a
> >number of reasons).
> >
> >Use the following steps to exploit this vulnerability:
> >
> >Step 1: Log in to your workstation using your Active Directory domain 
account.
> >This account only needs to have administrative access to your 
workstation.
> >Step 2: Create an interactive scheduled task to run a minute after 
creating it.
> >This scheduled task brings up a command prompt as the NT 
Authority\SYSTEM
> >account on Windows XP, and 2003. 'at 11:24 /interactive cmd.exe'. If 
using
> >Windows Vista, 7, or 2008 Server, the attacker can use the psexec tool 
(psexec
> >-i -s cmd.exe).
> >Step 3: Once the SYSTEM command prompt comes up, open regedit from the
> >command line.
> >Step 4: Browse to 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Cache'
> >Step 5: The list of "NL$1-10" records contain the cached active 
directory
> >domain account sessions. To identify which account is yours, perform 
the
> >following steps. Take note of all NL$ entries and entry content. Change 
your
> >domain account password. Leave the SYSTEM shell and regedit application
> >open. Log off the workstation, and then log back in to your domain 
account.
> >Refresh the NL$ list. The NL$ line item that has been updated is your 
domain
> >user's cached session.
> >Step 6: For this example, we will assume that your NL$ record is "NL$4"
> >Step 7: Double click on "NL$4". Take note of the four hex characters 
that are
> >located in positions 1, 2, 3, and 4 on line 3 of the hex data.
> >Step 8: For this example, the hex characters are "5a 04". This number is 
the
> >Active Directory octet string representation of your domain account's
> >objectSID (The user account unique section of your AD Security 
Identifier).
> >Step 9: For this example, there is only one other cached account listed 
in the
> >NL$ listing (NL$3). Double click on "NL$3". Take note of the four hex 
characters
> >that are located in positions 1, 2, 3, and 4 on line 3 of the hex data.
> >Step 10: For this example, the hex characters are "59 04". This user 
account is
> >"Domain\DomainAdminAcct".
> >Step 11: Double click on "NL$4". Replace your SID hex representation "5a 
04",
> >with DomainAdminAcct's SID hex representation "59 04".
> >Step 12: *Important* Disconnect all physical network connections from 
the
> >workstation.
> >Step 13: Log off of the domain account, then log back in to your domain
> >account.
> >Step 14: You will now be logged in to your modified cached account that 
is
> >really the Domain Admin's account.
> >Step 15: You are now free to modify system files and user account 
profiles
> >using the identity of the Domain Admin's account. This includes 
creating
> >scripts to run as the Domain Admin account the next time that they log 
in. All
> >files created will not be linked to your domain account. All security 
access lists
> >will only show the Domain Admin's account once you log out of the 
modified
> >cached account.
> >Step 16: All actions taken are indeed logged in the Security Event Log, 
but all
> >actions are shown as being completed by "Domain\DomainAdminAcct".
> >Deeper inspection of event logs will show inside the login and logout 
events
> >for your modified cached account, your actual user name is listed inside 
the
> >event, but not in the Security Event Log Viewer listing. Event log 
entries for
> >object access will only be created if administrators are auditing 
successful
> >access to files (This will lead to enormous event log sizes). These 
events will
> >be listed as being performed as "Domain\DomainAdminAcct" in the event 
log
> >viewer, but deeper inspection will show your true user name.
> >
> >VULNERABLE PRODUCTS:
> >All patch levels of Windows 2003 Server, Windows XP, Windows Vista,
> >Windows 7, and Windows 2008 Server.
> >
> >REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
> >N/A
> >
> >CREDITS:
> >StenoPlasma (at) ExploitDevelopment.com
> >
> >TIMELINE:
> >Discovery: December 4, 2010
> >Vendor Notified: December 7, 2010
> >Vendor Fixed: N/A
> >Vendor Dismissed: December 9, 2010
> >Vendor Notified of Disclosure: December 9, 2010
> >Disclosed: December 9, 2010
> >
> >VENDOR URL:
> >http://www.microsoft.com
> >
> >ADVISORY URL:
> >http://www.ExploitDevelopment.com/Vulnerabilities/2010-M$-002.html
> >
> >VENDOR ADVISORY URL:
> >N/A
> >
> >
> >-------------------------------------------------------------
> >StenoPlasma at ExploitDevelopment.com
> >www.ExploitDevelopment.com
> >-------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >_______________________________________________
> >Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> >Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> >Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ 



_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

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