Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2011 19:56:18 +0100
From: Pete Herzog <lists@...com.org>
To: Zach C <fxchip@...il.com>
Cc: "full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Getting Off the Patch

Zach,

Please allow me to strip away any opinion for a moment and focus on 
the facts which seem to be something we will agree on.

1. A patch when applied changes the source code.
2. Patches are released AFTER a flaw is reported.
3. A patch will fix one or more reported flaws in the code.
4. The means to absolutely verify the true source of the patch 
requires that your security has not already been compromised.
5. Evidence shows that patches, under the guise of security, have been 
used in the past as a means for a company to change the function of 
their product, remove content, or enforce licensing terms after it has 
been purchased and installed on the computer.
6. Patching alone, without operational controls, has not shown to 
protect systems or services consistently.

Therefore using the facts, we can logically conclude the following: 
For every software, there are an unknown quantity of flaws. You 
protect the software with multiple varied controls to protect against 
flaws both reported and not. Therefore when you fix the flaw, you are 
only fixing a known and reported flaw. This does not protect you 
against the unknown, unreported flaws still existing and why you still 
need operational controls. So to say that you need to patch to fix a 
flaw ignores all the flaws you don't know about. To fix each flaw in 
addition to adding controls adds new uncertainties both to the 
software and the operational controls and requires further 
verification testing to avoid surprise problems. A small change does 
not mean it's a small test. To ignore the functional testing after 
patching is to trust that the software maker knows your operations 
better than you, has your best interest in mind above their own 
profits, and that is if you can even be sure of where the patch came 
from. Patch only because you can't control the interactions, can't 
stop the interactions, don't do any quality control or functionality 
testing anyway, or don't know if you've been already compromised anyway.

Sincerely,
-pete.

On 1/11/2011 2:53 PM, Zach C wrote:
> Hmm. So you propose other measures of security as a way of circumventing the requirement of patching vulnerable software. That's nice, but it occurs to me that the vulnerable software is still vulnerable, and sandboxing (as you mentioned in an example) isn't always possible or feasible -- maybe it requires a code change, who knows. I see you mention the time it takes to test patches and their effect on your workflow, but I would figure an equal or greater amount of time would then need to be spent on other solutions as well -- and even when those other solutions are implemented, the software that you're doing all this to is still vulnerable, and likely in a way that such measures can't really prevent all that well (code theft, etc).
>
> Am I mistaken? I thought I got all that right. I haven't read the OSSTMM 3 yet, granted (it's on my to-do list), but I would think that it's still worth doing all that -- just that disregarding patches entirely in favor of this isn't the solution either, which is probably not what you're saying. :)
>
> On Jan 10, 2011, at 11:41 AM, Pete Herzog<lists@...com.org>  wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Here's a new article on how and why you may want to stop patching your
>> software and take a new approach to your security.
>>
>> "So if patching is a tactic towards a particular security strategy,
>> how can that be bad? I never said it was all bad. There are reasons
>> where patching makes sense just like there are reasons to get a kick
>> from a cup of coffee, get kicked by a shot of tequila, or spray stuff
>> up your nose to breathe easier for 1.5 seconds. Yes, for the record, I
>> am comparing patching to nasal spray."
>>
>> Read it here:
>>
>> https://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/10813-Getting-Off-the-Patch.html
>>
>> Sincerely,
>> -pete.
>>
>> --
>> Pete Herzog - Managing Director - pete@...com.org
>> ISECOM - Institute for Security and Open Methodologies
>> www.isecom.org - www.osstmm.org
>> www.hackerhighschool.org - www.badpeopleproject.org
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>
>
>

-- 
Pete Herzog - Managing Director - pete@...com.org
ISECOM - Institute for Security and Open Methodologies
www.isecom.org - www.osstmm.org
www.hackerhighschool.org - www.badpeopleproject.org

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

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