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Message-ID: <AANLkTin=694tAfcsFJD8vdk75E6JFtMUA0k+Xnek-iY3@mail.gmail.com> Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2011 14:15:04 +0200 From: Michele Orru <antisnatchor@...il.com> To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Subject: [AntiSnatchOr] DotCloud Beta Multiple Vulnerabilities DotCloud Beta Multiple Vulnerabilities Name: DotCloud Beta Multiple Vulnerabilities Systems Affected: DotCloud current beta Severity: Medium Vendor: http://www.dotcloud.com Advisory: http://antisnatchor.com/dotcloud_beta_multiple_vulnerabilities Author: Michele "antisnatchor" Orru (michele.orru AT antisnatchor DOT com) Date: 20110328 I. BACKGROUND DotCloud is a new managed IaaS aimed to create "mashups" of applications ready-to-be-deployed. II. DESCRIPTION Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in the web application used to access the user API/SSH keys. III. ANALYSIS a. Open Redirection The "next" parameter of the following URLs is vulnerable to Open Redirection: http://www.dotcloud.com/account/create http://www.dotcloud.com/account/login To exploit Open Redirection on the first URL is enough to put a not already registered email address in the "email" parameter: GET http://www.dotcloud.com/account/create?email=antisnatchor%40gmaill.com&password=antisnatchor123&password_confirm=antisnatchor123&invite_code=2x1hRF&next=http%3a//www.google.com HTTP/1.1 The second one is present during the login action, so it's pre-authenticated and this fact increases the security risk: POST /account/login HTTP/1.1 Host: www.dotcloud.com [...] Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 87 email=antisnatchor%40gmail.com&password=antisnatchor123&next=http%3a//www.google.com Open Redirection can be used for phishing purposes or to execute malicious code on the victim behalf: it would be easy for an attacker to exploit them to hook the victim browser to BeEF and then redirect back the victim on the login page, while logging their keystrokes with Javascript for example. b. Credentials are sent in cleartext No SSL certificates are used at all to protect sensitive informations from eavesdropping attacks like MITM. c. Sensitive form with autocomplete enabled As can be seen in the login page: <form action="/account/login" method="post" id="login-form" class="big"> <fieldset> <p> <label for="email">Email Address</label> <input name="email" id="email" type="text" value="" tabindex="1" /> </p> <p> <label for="password">Password</label> <input name="password" id="password" type="password" value="" tabindex="2" /> the password form field don't have the autocomplete=off attribute in place. This could lead an attacker to steal the credentials stored in the browsers if having XSS in the next releases of the DotCloud webapp, or in this case after exploiting the Open Redirection vulnerability. d. Cookie without HttpOnly flag Even if there are ways to bypass this security measure, the HttpOnly flag should always be added to prevent accessing the cookies from Javascript. e. No anti-XSRF tokens on sensitive forms submissions No unique tokens are added to sensitive forms to prevent replay attacks like Cross Site Request Forgery. At least the forms to change the API key and the form to upload an SSH key should be protected in this way, to prevent that in case of any XSS that would be present in the next releases of the DotCloud webapp things would't get worse. IV. DETECTION DotCloud current beta is vulnerable. V. WORKAROUND Redirects should not be controlled by users: build a server-side white list of known-good URLs where the redirect should point to, for example. VI. VENDOR RESPONSE Fixed from 14 March 2011. VII. CVE INFORMATION No CVE at this time. VII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 20110307 Initial vendor contact 20110310 Initial vendor response 20110314 Vendor fixes issues 20110328 Public disclosure VIII. CREDIT Michele "antisnatchor" Orru' IX. LEGAL NOTICES Copyright (c) 2011 Michele "antisnatchor" Orru' Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert electronically. It may not be edited in any way without mine express written consent. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please email me for permission. Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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